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INTRODUCTION 
Tort law emerged as a separate field in the 1870s.  But it was a rocky 
start.  In 1871, the young Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. asserted that “[t]orts 
is not a proper subject for a law book.”1  His reason for saying this was the 
absence of any “cohesion or legal relationship” among the topics grouped 
under the heading of “torts.”2  Holmes soon changed his mind,3 and within 
a decade had famously organized tort liability around the standards of 
conduct that governed different torts.  Today all tort lawyers, scholars, and 
teachers following Holmes (whether they know it or not) understand that 
there are three bases of liability in tort: intent, negligence, and strict 
liability.4  That is ordinarily how we think about tort liability, and how we 
organize tort law in our thinking.   
But that way of thinking actually does not capture, and has never 
captured, all of tort law.  This may be one of the reasons Holmes originally 
had doubts about the viability of tort law as a legal subject.  A quick look at 
any of the Restatements of Torts, or at the leading treatises and casebooks, 
reveals that his tripartite division is only partly reflected in their 
organizational structure.  Many torts typically are treated in piecemeal, 
atomistic fashion, as if they fall outside of this tripartite structure of 
organization altogether.  In addition, very different matters are addressed 
under the three divisions: sometimes full-blown torts (such as battery) are 
discussed, but sometimes only the nature of an abstract standard of conduct 
(such as negligence) is the focus. 5  Something else, or something 
 
 1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 5 AM. L. REV. 337, 341 (1871).  The review was 
unsigned; Mark DeWolf Howe attributed it to Holmes after finding a copy of the review in Holmes’s 
papers.  See 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 
1870-1882 (1963).  Holmes was born in March of 1841, so he was at most thirty years old when he 
wrote the quoted passage. 
 2. Holmes, supra note 1, at 341. 
 3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 659–60 (1873) 
(concluding that enumerating actions that were successful and ones that failed might be sufficient 
to give the subject of torts an identity).  Howe also attributes this unsigned article to Holmes.  See 
HOWE, supra note 1, at 64. 
 4. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS xvi–xxviii (2000) (dividing liability for 
interference with person or property into intended, negligent, and innocent interference); KENNETH 
S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 2 (5th ed. 2017) (dividing all of tort law 
based on the standard of care into liability for intention, negligence, and strict liability). 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 923–1227 (12th ed. 2020) (treating defamation, privacy, misrepresentation, inducement of 
breach of contract, and unfair competition in this manner); DOBBS, supra note 4, at 1117–405 
(treating defamation, privacy, misusing and denying judicial process, interference with family 
relationships, interference with contract and economic opportunity, harms to intangibles and unfair 
competition, nuisance, misrepresentation and nondisclosure, and lawyer malpractice in this 
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additional, is going on in tort law, but exactly what is not clear, and never 
becomes clear. 
The kernel of truth in what Holmes first thought about torts is that tort 
law is not the coherent field it is sometimes thought to be.  In fact, the 
untidy, fragmented organizational structure of tort law is the legacy of a lost 
history that not only helps to explain tort law’s puzzling organization, but 
also to reveal the underlying disordered character of tort law itself.  It is 
difficult to order something that is essentially disordered.   
Recent experience confirms this.  The American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
has been preparing the Restatement (Third) of Torts, in a series of separate 
projects, for nearly thirty years now.6  The latest individual project is 
entitled “Intentional Torts to Persons.”7  The project is an apt example of 
the puzzling organization of tort law.  The project covers only battery, 
assault, and false imprisonment.8  Why are the torts covered by the 
“intentional torts to persons” project not the only intentional torts to 
persons?  What about fraud, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, for example?   
In addition, what do battery, assault, and false imprisonment have 
sufficiently in common to warrant putting those torts together in a category 
by themselves?  As if to underscore this question, the Reporters for the 
project recently noted that comparing the torts of battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment “is sometimes akin to comparing apples and oranges, because 
these torts protect a varied set of interests or protect them in varying 
ways.”9  More than a decade earlier, writing about whether an intentional 
torts project should be undertaken at all, one of these (future) Reporters had 
already recognized this apples-and-oranges problem.10  So there is a 
legitimate question whether those torts belong together, and if they do, why.   
 
manner); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–869 (AM. LAW INST. 1977 and 1979) 
(treating a long series of separate torts in this manner). 
 6. Thus far the final, published projects, which were years in the making, are RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (AM. LAW INST. 1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (AM. LAW INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (AM. LAW INST.  2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (AM. LAW INST. 2012); and 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM (AM. LAW INST.  2018). 
 7. The project at this point has been the subject of over two-dozen drafts.  See Restatement of 
the Law Third, Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, AM. LAW INST. (2020), 
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/torts-intentional-torts-persons/#_drafts. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Kenneth W. Simons & W. Jonathan Cardi, Restating the Intentional Tort to Persons: Seeing 
the Forest and the Trees, 10 J. TORT L. 1, 2 (2018). 
 10. Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 
1080 (2006).  
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Despite the legitimacy of this question, however, we do not object to 
the placement of those torts together, generally or in the Third Restatement.  
For reasons we will describe, a good case can be made that they belong 
together.  More importantly, however, virtually any classification that puts 
more than one tort in the same category is liable to create an apples-and-
oranges problem.  In tort law, we will argue, for 150 years now the choice 
has inevitably been between engaging in classification that generates an 
apples-and-oranges problem and not classifying, but reproducing “chaos 
with an index.”11   
In this Article, we uncover the ways in which the history and the very 
nature of tort liability have combined to defeat repeated efforts at coherent 
conceptualization of this body of law.  Part I examines the challenge that 
the treatise and casebook writers faced late in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as they attempted to organize and classify the different 
features of the new subject of tort law after the ancient, procedure-based 
“forms of action” and the writ system they accompanied were abolished.12  
This Part identifies and analyzes the different ways those scholars 
struggled, and, with the exception of the shallow approach that we call 
“interest” analysis, largely failed to develop categories which satisfactorily 
transcended the forms of action. 
Part II ventures into the archives of the ALI, in which the now-obscure 
evolution of the First Restatement of Torts is recorded, as that project first 
attempted, but then largely abandoned, an effort to develop a new, coherent 
organization of tort law.13  The intentional torts are a key to this story, 
though not because they are especially important in themselves.  Rather, 
they happened to be the first torts that the first draft of the First Restatement 
addressed.  That first draft revealed an incipient vision of tort law’s 
structure which appeared to be developing, but that vision sputtered and 
then disappeared, both from future drafts and from conventional histories of 
tort law.  What ultimately took the place of that vision was the puzzling and 
fragmented organization of tort law that has come down to us today, all the 
way from that First Restatement.   
We then turn to the modern period.  Part III shows the ways in which 
the organization adopted by the First Restatement has persisted and been 
replicated, with treatises, casebooks, and both the Second and Third 
 
 11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 5 AM. L. REV. 110, 114 (1870) (“[T]he old-
fashioned English lawyer’s idea of a satisfactory body of law was a chaos with a full index.”).  It is 
perhaps ironic, given his first thoughts about the propriety of treating torts as a separate subject, that 
this phrase has sometimes been attributed to Holmes.  See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR, RELIGION AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 225 (2d ed. 2005).  
 12. See infra Part I.  
 13. See infra Part II.  
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Restatements largely accepting and adopting the organization of tort law 
that found its way into the First Restatement.14   
Finally, Part IV explains why that organization has not been 
replaced.15  One reason is that no one has produced a satisfactory 
alternative.  This is because there is no consensus on any comprehensive 
underlying purpose of tort law, and because a more coherent organization of 
the subject would have little usefulness to the practicing bar.  But the main 
reason lies in the inevitable character of tort law as a series of independent 
causes of action.  Ironically, the same imperatives that generated the ancient 
forms of action continue to dictate the fragmented structure of tort law 
today.   
I. CONCEPTUALIZING TORT LAW: THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY CHALLENGE 
For more than half a millennium, the medieval writ system and its 
accompanying “forms of action”—the technical procedural pigeon-holes 
into which lawsuits were required to fit—governed civil actions at common 
law.16  Then, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, that system 
began to break down and was replaced by the “unitary” civil action as we 
now know it.  The abolition of the forms of action meant that substantive 
law now took conceptual precedence over the ancient procedures.  As a 
result, the field of tort law emerged, finally discernible independently of 
procedure.   
Legal scholars in the ensuing half-century then faced the challenge of 
describing the constituent parts of this new body of law.  Those torts 
scholars conceptualized tort law in different ways, employing different 
organizational approaches.  But none ever successfully introduced a 
coherent conceptualization of the field, in part because of the very nature of 
the subject, and in part because of the difficulty of escaping the lingering 
legacy of the forms of action.  Early in the twentieth century, tort law was 
still conceptually fragmented.  This Part tells how that fragmentation came 
to be. 
A. The Forms of Action 
From medieval times onward, instituting a civil suit required a “writ,” 
which was available only for a distinct and limited number of “forms of 
 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See generally F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor 
& W.J. Whitaker eds., 1909). 
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action.”17  There were two forms of action employed in cases involving 
bodily injury or property damage not arising out of breach of contract.18  
The first was “trespass,” which required that injury to a person or damage 
to property had been direct and by force.  In fact, when trespass was 
brought for causing bodily injury, it was denominated trespass vi et armis—
“by force and arms”—even if weapons had nothing to do with it.19  Early 
on, the availability of a damage remedy in the common law courts for 
conduct that met the trespass requirements seems to have signaled that the 
conduct was socially disapproved of (conduct that precipitated actions in 
trespass was ritualistically described as a “breach of the King’s peace”), and 
that a damage remedy was being employed as a preferable alternative to a 
violent reprisal by the injured party.20  Those historical features of trespass 
slowly faded away even while it was still in force, but they were part of its 
origins and influenced its development.   
Thus, trespass was available only in a limited number of situations.  
Bodily injury and property damage that did not occur directly, and other 
forms of loss, did not fall within its scope.  Another form of action, termed 
“trespass on the case” or just “case” for short, became available in a 
residual category of situations, originally involving indirectly caused 
physical harm.21  Eventually trespass on the case was the form of action 
also employed for slander, libel, deceit, and certain forms of negligence.22  
Another form of action, “assumpsit,” which was available for certain other 
forms of misfeasance, grew out of trespass on the case.23   
Because of the differences among them, the choice of a form of action 
could be dispositive: 
[T]o a very considerable degree the substantive law administered 
in a given form of action has grown up independently of the law 
administered in other forms.  Each procedural pigeon-hole contains 
its own rules of substantive law, and it is with great caution that we 
 
 17. Id. at viii. 
 18. Early on such actions were very commonly not brought, largely because other nonlegal 
remedies existed and because choosing such remedies seems to have been socially favored.  George 
E. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 34 YALE L.J. 343, 368–69 (1925).  Over time 
trespass would spawn a number of other forms of action, including assumpsit, often employed for 
contract actions, and ejectment, used for certain invasions of land.  See generally A. W. B. SIMPSON, 
A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975); 
A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 145–55 (2d ed. 1986). 
 19. Woodbine, supra note 18, at 369–70. 
 20. R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL: 
STUDIES IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 240–44 (1959). 
 21. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 42. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at x; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6–63 (4th ed. 2002). 
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may argue from what is found in one to what will probably be 
found in another; each has its own precedents . . . . The plaintiff’s 
choice is irrevocable; he must play the rules of the game that he 
has chosen . . . . Lastly he may find that, plausible as his case may 
seem, it just will not fit any one of the receptacles provided by the 
courts and he may take to himself the lesson that where there is no 
remedy there is no wrong.24   
Some of the forms of action imposed what amounted to strict liability, 
while others did not.  For example, proof of intent to cause harm was not 
required in trespass actions.25  Since battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment were actionable in trespass,26 it follows that these “intentional 
torts” were not intentional at common law, although they frequently would 
have been accompanied by intent to cause harm.27  Over time, the fact that 
the actions brought in trespass often involved some purposive conduct on 
the part of defendants, and that those brought in case involved conduct that 
typically was accidental or inadvertent, would be emphasized by scholars 
conceptualizing and organizing the law of torts in treatises and casebooks.  
But even at the end of the era during which the forms of action governed, 
there was no established classification of different forms of tort liability 
based on varying standards of conduct.28  In fact, there was no established 
classification of tort law at all.29   
 
 24. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 25. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General 
Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 450–52 (1990) (citing JOSEPH A. KOFFLER & 
ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 64, 153, 174 (1969); Woodbine, supra 
note 18; George F. Deiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220, 221 (1917); 
and 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME 
OF EDWARD I 526 (1968)).  
 26. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 118–21 (1768). 
 27. One study has discovered a number of nineteenth-century trespass actions in which intent 
was not required.  See Vandevelde, supra note 25, at 452–53 (citing Higginson v. York, 5 Mass. 
341 (1809) (holding defendant who mistakenly took wood from another’s land, believing it to be 
owned by a third party, subject to liability); Dexter v. Cole, 6 Wisc. 319 (1858) (holding defendant 
who mistakenly slaughtered sheep belonging to another after the sheep became mixed up with a 
flock of the defendant’s sheep subject to liability); and Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N.H. 420 (1870) 
(holding defendant who pushed a second schoolboy in play, causing that boy to collide with a third 
boy, who retaliated by pushing the second boy into a wall, subject to liability to the second boy)). 
 28. The dispute in the famous dog-fight case, Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850), is an 
example of the confusion that the procedural features of the forms of action produced regarding 
substantive issues such as the standard of care and burden of proof. 
 29. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 13–14 (2d ed. 
2003); S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 254–56, 269–70, 346–
51 (1969). 
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B. Abolition of the Forms of Action and the Emergence of “Tort” 
Liability 
There was increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of action as the 
nineteenth century proceeded.  This dissatisfaction stemmed from the 
forms’ tendency to privilege procedural technicalities over substantive rules 
and principles.  Speaking of this tendency in one of the more striking 
images in the history of legal scholarship, Sir Henry Maine observed that 
the forms of action were so dominant in the early years of the common law 
that “substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the 
interstices of procedure.”30   
Francis Hilliard, who published the first American torts treatise in 
1859, wrote in his preface to that work that “[b]y a singular process of 
inversion . . . , remedies [the procedural requirements of the writs and forms 
of action] have been substituted for wrongs [the substantive elements of tort 
actions].”31  “[T]o inquire for what injuries a particular action may be 
brought, instead of explaining the injuries themselves,” he felt, “seems to 
me to reverse the natural order of things.”32   
Similarly, as we noted above, Holmes initially concluded that “Torts is 
not a proper subject for a law book” because its various causes of action 
lacked “cohesion” or a proper “legal relationship.”33  He attributed that in 
part to the failings of the forms of action, which did not “embod[y] in a 
practical shape a classification of the law, with a form of action to 
correspond to every substantial duty,” but were “in fact so arbitrary in 
character, and owe their origin to such purely historical causes, that nothing 
keeps them but our respect for the sources of our jurisprudence.”34  And 
Nicholas St. John Green, in his preface to an 1870 abridged edition of 
Charles G. Addison’s 1860 English treatise, THE LAW OF TORTS, which 
Green used in his torts course at Harvard, noted that torts was “usually 
treated of under the titles of the various forms of action which lie for the 
infringement of . . . rights which avail against other persons generally, or 
against all mankind.”35  Such an emphasis, he felt, tended “to confuse those 
 
 30. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM: CHIEFLY 
SELECTED FROM LECTURES DELIVERED AT OXFORD 389 (1883). 
 31. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS v–vi (1859). 
 32. Id. at vii.  
 33. See Holmes, Book Notices, supra note 1, at 341.  
 34. Id. at 359. 
 35. Nicholas St. John Green, Preface to CHARLES ADDISON, WRONGS AND REMEDIES, 
ABRIDGED FOR USE IN THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, iii (Nicholas St. John Green 
ed. 1870). 
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fundamental principles which should be kept distinct in the mind of the 
student.”36 
Another factor contributing to support for abolition of the forms of 
action was the changing nature of the bar as the nation grew, 
demographically and geographically.  The American population and the 
territory of the United States expanded dramatically in the three decades 
beginning in the 1830s, with an increased number of immigrants from 
Europe coming to America, and the United States acquiring a vast amount 
of territory west of the Mississippi.37  Developments in transportation, 
including the emergence of canals and railroads, facilitated the movement 
of populations westward and resulted in many new states entering the 
Union as their populations reached sufficient numbers.38  Those states 
needed lawyers, and the bars of those states welcomed them.  In many new 
states in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, it was not necessary for an applicant 
to the bar to have graduated from a law school or to have served as an 
apprentice to a law office.39  The result was an influx of new lawyers in new 
states whose training was rudimentary.  In that setting, few lawyers could 
be expected to know the intricacies of the forms of action and writ pleading; 
they probably were often ignored.   
At the same time, a movement emerged in some states to “codify” the 
law.  This meant replacing the common law with a state-enacted 
comprehensive code, modeled on those of European nations that had 
established civil law systems.  The expectation was that codes would have 
far more detailed doctrinal rules than those supplied by judges in deciding 
common law cases.  This would result in ordinary people having a better 
understanding of their legal rights and responsibilities, and in the reduction 
of judicial discretion to make law.  Proponents of codification also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the dominance of English common law 
doctrines in the United States and with the technicalities of the forms of 
action.40   
When the 1848 Field Code in New York was the first to abolish the 
forms of action and substitute a unitary civil action, it became available as a 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. See G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS 
THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 248–60, 271–78 (2012).  
 38. Id. at 292. 
 39. See id. at 285–87; see also Jack Nortrup, The Education of a Western Lawyer, 12 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 294, 294 (1968). 
 40. On the nineteenth-century codification movement in America see CHARLES M. COOK, THE 
AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981); Robert 
W. Gordon, Book Review: The American Codification Movement, A Study of Antebellum Legal 
Reform, 36 VAND. L. REV. 431, 445 (1983).  
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template for procedural reform.41  California abolished the forms of action 
three years later.42  In all, twenty-four states or territories adopted versions 
of the Field Code in the two and a half decades after 1848, fourteen of 
which being states that entered the Union in 1850 or later.43  Additional 
states followed thereafter.44  The forms of action were disappearing.  The 
question was: What was taking, or would take, their place?   
C. The Search for Conceptual Order 
Abolition of the forms of action moved substance to the foreground.  
But this posed a problem.  Previously, procedure was the dominant means 
of providing a semblance of conceptual order to the law governing civil 
actions.  That would not now suffice; indeed, it would be misleading.  A 
half-century of intellectual struggle to provide conceptual substance ensued, 
through scholarly efforts to identify what the law of torts consisted of, and 
then to classify the constituent parts of that body of law.  Classification was 
thus the central preoccupation of the torts scholars who worked after the 
forms of action were abolished.   
Two surprisingly different products emerged.  Treatises on the new 
subject of torts published in the second half of the nineteenth century took 
on the challenge of classification.  They attempted simultaneously to 
transcend the now-abolished forms of action and to paint a picture of tort 
law as it stood at that time.  What they offered bore the imprints of their 
efforts, but they were not terribly successful in producing coherent portraits 
of tort law.  In contrast, for reasons we will indicate, casebooks—
sometimes written by the same author who had published a treatise—stayed 
much more anchored to the forms of action that had dominated the past.   
1. The Impetus for Classification 
The opinion of the scholars who began working on tort law after 
abolition of the forms of action was that the forms had been an obstacle to 
understanding tort law on the basis of substantive principles.  Holmes 
suggested, for example, that, had the forms of action that were employed in 
tort actions corresponded to “every substantial duty” in the field, a 
 
 41. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems, and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 533 
(1925); CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA 
AND ENGLAND 114, 124 (1897). 
 42. Civil Practice Act of 1851, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 307 (providing that ““[t]here shall be 
in this State but one form of civil actions, for the enforcement or protection of private rights, and 
the redress or prevention of private wrongs”“). 
 43. Clark, supra note 41, at 534.  
 44. Id.  
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“practical” “classification” of tort law would have been accomplished.45  If 
such a correspondence had been achieved, he intimated, the forms of action 
would have been the equivalent of substantive doctrinal categories.  But 
they were not: they were “arbitrary,” sometimes owing their existence to 
“purely historical causes” rather than efforts to match them up with the 
particular doctrinal requirements of individual torts.46   
It was not as if prominent torts scholars such as Hilliard, Holmes, and 
Green did not know the sort of conduct that was actionable in tort.  Many 
forms of tort liability were of ancient origin: assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, trespass to real and personal property, slander, libel, and 
deceit had been actionable for centuries.  Moreover, those actions were 
perceived as qualitatively different from actions in contract and actions 
affecting real or personal property: they were brought under the distinctive 
forms of action of trespass and case.  Hilliard and the others could readily 
have listed the actions available for civil wrongs not arising out of contract.  
But the grouping of tort actions around the forms of action employed to 
make them actionable rendered uncertain what they had in common, or 
what their subject matter identity was composed of, except for being civil 
“wrongs.”   
For this reason, a common goal of torts treatises in the late nineteenth 
century was to classify tort causes of action based on their substance rather 
than on the basis of the now-abolished forms of action.  But why did some 
form of conceptual ordering of the field of torts, based on some general 
understanding of what tort actions were, what they had in common, and 
how they were distinguished from other common law actions, seem an 
imperative for late nineteenth-century scholars?  The answer, we think, is 
that this was a period when American intellectuals were embarking on an 
epistemological search for order, seeking to organize and classify fields of 
knowledge on the basis of common, foundational principles.47  The search-
for-order impulse has been linked to two phenomena that defined the 
experience of many post-Civil War Americans: (1) the collapse of religious-
based explanations for the course of human events in the wake of pressure 
from secular-based explanations such as Darwinian theories of natural 
selection and (2) the enthusiasm for “scientific” organization of fields of 
knowledge along the lines of the natural sciences, which had begun to 
 
 45. Holmes, Book Notices, supra note 1, at 359. 
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feature the classification of fields on the basis of common characteristics 
and governing principles.48   
This was a preoccupation in law as much as in other fields.  When 
Christopher Columbus Langdell published the first casebook on contract 
law in 1871, its preface urged students “to select, classify, and arrange all 
the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, 
development, or establishment of . . . essential doctrines.”49  Thus, the idea 
of arranging and classifying common law subjects around their fundamental 
principles was not merely a response to the fact that any conceptual order 
the forms of action had supplied for those fields could not be expected to 
survive their replacement by the unitary civil action.  It was also part of a 
general interest in finding or fashioning conceptual order within fields of 
knowledge.  And of all the common law subjects, tort law posed the 
greatest organizational and conceptual challenges.  This was because the 
field appeared to be something of a default category, a set of private wrongs 
that were not crimes, and did not arise out of contract, but had little else in 
common.   
The matter was further complicated by the fact that the principal 
function of trespass and trespass on the case had been to distinguish actions 
involving injuries “directly” caused by “force” from other alleged civil 
wrongs.50  Holmes eventually concluded that those distinguishing 
characteristics, when added to an enumeration of actions that were 
successful and ones that failed, might be sufficient to give the subject of 
torts an identity.51  But that was still quite far from revealing what 
principles tort actions had in common.   
2. The Challenges of Classification: Treatises 
For this reason, late nineteenth-century torts scholars wanted to go 
further.  They aspired to show, in the words of Francis Hilliard, that tort law 
“involve[ed] principles of great comprehensiveness.”52  However, those 
scholars turned out to have enormous difficulty achieving this goal.  They 
had to arrive at an organization of tort law that was not based on the forms 
of action but that revealed a coherent set of substantive principles.  What 
they were actually able to produce was not coherent; it was a fragmented 
organization, if it can be called an organization at all.   
 
 48. See FREDRICKSON, supra note 47,  at 199–216; WIEBE, supra note 47, at 140–48; 
LAURENCE VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 21–56 (1965).  
 49. C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (1871). 
 50. See MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 42.  
 51. See Holmes, The Theory of Torts, supra note 3, at 659–60. 
 52. HILLIARD, supra note 31, at viii. 
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Hilliard’s 1859 treatise was the first significant work published on 
torts after abolition of the forms of action had begun ten years earlier.  He 
indicated that although he had “entire confidence” that the fundamental 
principles of tort law could be identified, he had “equal diffidence as to the 
execution.”53  By “execution” Hilliard very likely meant offering an 
arrangement or classification of tort law that would reveal the “principles of 
great comprehensiveness” which supposedly characterized the field.54   
He was right to be diffident.  The two volumes of his treatise 
addressed a grab-bag of subjects, including some that would not today be 
included in tort law at all.55  Some chapters were devoted to individual tort 
actions such as assault and battery, which were combined in a chapter 
entitled “Torts to the Person.”56  That was at least a start at conceptual 
classification.  But other causes of action which would subsequently come 
to be thought of as “intentional” torts, such as false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, and conversion, were covered in separate chapters.57  
Still other chapters were not about causes of action at all, but the duties of 
categories of individuals or entities, including husbands, wives, parents, 
corporations, and railroads.58  And although there was a chapter on 
nuisance, and one on “Injuries to Property,”59 there was none on negligence, 
despite Hilliard’s having chapters about other duties.  For some reason 
Hilliard seems not to have recognized that although trespass on the case no 
longer existed, the types of negligence liability that had been subsumed 
under that form of action still did.   
The core of the problem that Hilliard and subsequent scholars faced 
was explaining not only what tort liability there was, but why liability was 
not imposed when it could conceivably have been.  The common law of the 
time had a term for conduct that caused harm but was not actionable—
damnum absque injuria—which roughly translates as loss without a legal 
remedy.60  Hilliard referred to the term in his treatise, as did other late 
nineteenth-century commentators on tort law.61  In discussing the doctrine 
of damnum absque injuria in treatises and casebooks in the 1870s, several 
 
 53. Id. at x. 
 54. Id. at viii.  
 55. Illustrations include chapters on bailments, patents, and copyrights, and in a chapter on 
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 56. Id. at xiii. 
 57. Id. at xiii–xix. 
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 59. Id. at xv. 
 60. See EDWARD P. WEEKS, THE DOCTRINE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA CONSIDERED IN 
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commentators gave explanations for it that appear circular.  Charles 
Addison maintained that when an injury was the result of “a lawful act, 
done in a lawful manner,” there was “no legal injury” and hence “no tort 
giving rise to an action for damages.”62  Thomas Shearman and Amasa 
Redfield, who published a treatise on negligence in 1869, stated that as long 
as someone was “engaged in a lawful business,” they were not “responsible 
for an injury caused purely by inevitable accident.”63  And Thomas Cooley, 
in his 1879 treatise on tort law, maintained that actors who did what was 
“right and lawful for one man to do” could not be accountable if their 
actions injured others, because what they were doing was a “proper 
exercise . . . of [their] rights” and thus could not inflict legal wrongs.64   
All of those explanations, however, begged the question of what was 
“right and lawful.”  Saying that there was no liability because no right had 
been violated was circular in the same way as saying, twenty years earlier, 
that there was no liability because no form of action was available under the 
circumstances.  The notion of damnum absque injuria was simply a 
placeholder for the reason, whatever it was, that there was no liability.  
Only Holmes seems to have advanced a substantive, non-circular reason 
why many acts that injured others did not give rise to tort liability: it was 
that “[t]he general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie 
where it falls”65 because it was expensive and time consuming to enlist the 
cumbersome machinery of the state in the effort.   
But for scholars who did not simply accept Holmes’ explanation, some 
other organizational principle was necessary.  Late nineteenth-century torts 
scholars experimented with two thematic organizations, one substantive but 
circular, and the other merely taxonomic.  The first centered on efforts to 
identify “rights” which, when “invaded” by certain conduct, resulted in the 
imposition of tort liability for the harm that resulted.  The other was based 
on the standards of conduct associated with tort liability.  Neither produced 
more than a semblance of conceptual clarification.   
 
 62. ADDISON, supra note 35 at 2, 43. 
 63. 1 THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE 3 (1869). 
 64. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE 
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 81 (1879).  
 65. The state, Holmes suggested, “might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company 
against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens’ mishaps among all its members . . . .  As 
between individuals it might adopt the mutual insurance principle . . . and divide damages when 
both were in fault . . . or it might throw all loss upon the actor irrespective of fault.”  “The state does 
not of these things, however, and the prevailing view is that its cumbrous and expensive machinery 
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quo.  State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good.”  OLIVER WENDELL 
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a. Organization Based on Invasions of “Rights” 
Thomas P. Cooley’s 1879 treatise on tort law succeeded in 
transcending the forms of action.66  The writ of trespass on the case was not 
even an entry in the index to Cooley’s treatise.  In addition, Cooley made a 
concerted, but not entirely successful, effort to get beyond Hilliard’s grab-
bag listing of tort actions.  The principal device Cooley employed to 
achieve conceptual ordering was borrowed from Blackstone, who had 
identified civil “wrongs” that were invasions of “rights.”67  Cooley placed 
assault, battery, and false imprisonment in a category of “wrongs affecting 
personal security,” which also included malicious prosecution.68  This 
organization suggested that Cooley was attempting to classify torts based 
on the rights they invaded.69   
Such an approach had been foreshadowed by Hilliard’s treatment of 
assault and battery as “Torts to the Person.”70  Cooley’s was the first 
sustained effort by an American torts scholar to invoke what we call an 
“interest” analysis, a classification of tort actions in terms of the rights or 
interests of the plaintiff that have been invaded or interfered with by the 
defendant’s conduct.  As we will see, efforts to organize tort law around the 
invasion of interests would become more frequent in the early twentieth 
century, as commentators became more convinced that a central function of 
tort law was identifying interests worthy of protection and determining 
under what circumstances they should be protected.  Other late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century torts treatise writers thereafter adopted versions 
of Cooley’s organizational emphasis on the invasion of “rights” whose 
invasion produced civil wrongs.71   
But Cooley’s effort to classify different tort causes of action based on 
the “rights” against whose invasion they provided protected did not extend 
much beyond his “wrongs affecting personal security” category.  Although 
 
 66. He devoted very little attention to them.  There was only one mention of the writ of trespass 
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supra note 26, at 115, 130–48. 
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Goudkamp & Donal Nolan eds. 2019). 
 70. HILLIARD, supra note 31, at xiii. 
 71. See, e.g., FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS xiii–xiv (1905) (referring to “[t]he 
Right Invaded by an Assault,” “[t]he Right Invaded by Battery,” and “[t]he Right Invaded by 
Defamation”). 
  
308 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81:293 
 
he included chapters on “injuries to family rights,” “wrongs in respect to 
civil and political rights,” and “invasion of rights in real property,”72 each of 
which pointed in the direction of “interest” analysis, his treatise also 
contained chapters that made no explicit reference to rights.  Those included 
slander and libel, fraud, nuisance, master and servant, “wrongs from non-
performance of conventional and statutory duties,” and “injuries by 
animals.”73  Whereas Hilliard had not addressed negligence at all, Cooley 
included negligence in the chapter on wrongs arising from non-performance 
of duties.74  Cooley also mirrored Hilliard by including some “wrongs” that 
would not now be placed within the field of tort law.  Those included 
violations of “civil and political rights,” such as religious liberty, the right 
to an education, and “[r]ights in the learned professions,” violations of 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks, and unauthorized bailments.75  Like 
Hilliard, then, Cooley was not only attempting to conceptualize the 
constituent parts of tort law; he was also struggling to define its boundaries 
and scope.   
b. Organization Based on Standards of Conduct 
Other scholars moved in a different organizational direction.  Some of 
their names are more familiar—Holmes, Pollock, Wigmore—partly because 
their approach ultimately became more widely adopted.  But we should not 
think that its ultimate success reflects immediate acceptance.  How to 
conceptualize and organize tort liability was very much open to debate in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Four important writers on 
tort law explored the possibility of a tripartite organization of the field 
based on standards of conduct.   
Holmes.  In 1873, Holmes had concluded that certain activities, such 
as allowing damned water or animals to escape, subjected those who had 
engaged in them to liability at their peril; other conduct, such as fraud and 
assault, appeared to require culpability; and still other conduct exposed 
defendants only when its social utility was outweighed by the serious risks 
it posed to others, a judgment based on “motives of policy . . . kept 
purposely indefinite.”76  Holmes called this last category tort liability based 
on “modern negligence,” by which he meant conduct that was socially 
 
 72. COOLEY, supra note 64, at viii–ix. 
 73. Id. at vii–x, xiv–xv. 
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useful but posed risks to “all the world,” as opposed to the special “duties” 
of certain parties, like common carriers, to designated classes of persons.77   
Holmes wanted to show that tort liability, even when it exposed 
defendants to liability at their peril, had almost always been based on 
“fault” of some sort, either of the intentional or negligent variety, and that 
in the great mass of modern torts cases, negligence cases, “fault” was a 
legal rather than a moral concept.78  Of the common law tort actions, 
however, only malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and possibly 
conspiracy had required culpability, in the form of “malice.”  The other 
actions brought under trespass or growing out of trespass on the case—
assault, battery, false imprisonment, deceit, slander and libel, and trespass 
to real and personal property—had not embodied a culpability requirement.   
Holmes dealt with this difficulty for his theory by limiting his 
discussion of “intentional torts” to deceit, defamation, malicious 
prosecution, and conspiracy79 and equating “intent” with malice.80  In so 
doing, Holmes created a category of tort actions that differed from actions 
resting on act-at-peril liability or negligence.81  He was content to classify 
the intentional torts as a subcategory of “fault” actions, lumping them 
together under a somewhat contrived culpability standard.  However, 
Holmes had not shown what more the torts based on “fraud, malice, and 
intent” had in common, and he had conveniently omitted from his 
classification the long-established torts of assault, battery, and false 
imprisonment, because they had not required intent when the forms of 
action were in force.82  What he had done was suggest that a salient 
organizing principle for tort actions was their standard of conduct.  
Bigelow.  In 1878, Melville Bigelow published a torts treatise that 
began with the insight 
that “torts spring, not from a common centre, but from a series of 
different centres. . . . Each [tort action] has its own peculiar rules 
of law, . . . and the same is true of all other branches of the general 
subject.  There is, then, no such thing as a typical tort.”83  A scholar 
holding this point of view—correct though it may have been—was 
bound to face challenges in organizing a treatise.   
 
 77. Id. at 653, 660. 
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The organization that followed was based partly on a classification of 
duties.84  Bigelow acknowledged that this organization was repetitive in that 
most of the topics he was addressing fell into one division.  At the same 
time, however, Bigelow identified another way of classifying tort causes of 
action.  That was to classify causes of action based on a “peculiar animus 
(intent) . . . essential to a right of redress for the alleged breach of duty;” 
actions in which “the existence or non-existence of the animus is 
immaterial;” and actions where “the breach of duty consists in damage 
caused by a failure to conform to the care or diligence or skill observed by 
prudent men.”85  Although all the causes of action arose from breaches of 
general or specific “duties,” what distinguished them was the standard of 
conduct that applied.   
Bigelow then grouped causes of action into those three divisions.  He 
placed deceit, slander and libel, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy in a 
group requiring “animus” to make out a successful action.86  He placed 
nearly all the remaining torts—assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
trespasses to real or personal property, infringement of patents and 
copyrights, violation of water rights, nuisance, damage by animals, escape 
of dangerous elements or substances, and enticement and seduction—in a 
group in which a showing of “animus” was immaterial because “the law 
conclusively presum[ed] that the act complained of, if proved, was 
intended”;87 and he placed negligence in the third group.88   
That organization, which would somewhat resemble Holmes’ in The 
Common Law, had some obvious difficulties.  Slander and libel were 
described as torts requiring a showing of intent to be actionable, which was 
clearly not the case.  Although assault, battery, false imprisonment, and 
trespass to real and personal property would subsequently come to be 
characterized as “intentional” torts, they had certainly not been, historically, 
actions in which “intent” was immaterial because “the law [had] 
conclusively presum[ed]” it.89  And there was every indication that 
nuisances, actions involving damage by animals, and Rylands v. Fletcher-
 
 84. This included “duties, which govern the relations of individuals to each other (1) as mere 
members of the State; or (2) as occupying some special situation towards each other not produced 
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occasion for breaches of duty between them that need not be treated as breaches of contract.”  Id. at 
3. 
 85. Id. at 5–6. 
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type actions (involving harm caused by nonnatural uses of land),90 were act-
at-peril torts in which neither intent nor negligence was required.  So 
perhaps the most that can be said for Bigelow’s organization was that it 
unconsciously served to demonstrate the accuracy of his opening insight 
that there was no such thing as a typical tort.   
Pollock and Wigmore.  Over the next fifteen years, two other 
important scholars concluded that organizing tort law based on the tripartite 
standards of conduct would be fruitful.  In 1887, the English torts scholar 
Frederick Pollock made it a basis for organizing his torts treatise.91  In the 
introduction to the 1887 edition of his torts treatise, Pollock stated that now 
that the English common law was “independent of forms of action,” it 
“would seem . . . that a rational exposition of the law of torts” based on 
“general principles of duty and liability” might be possible.92   
Pollock’s “rational exposition” of tort law would end up being based 
on a tripartite division of tort actions based on standards of conduct.  
Pollock first placed assault, battery, and false imprisonment in a category of 
wrongs he labeled “Personal Wrongs,” to which he added deceit, libel and 
slander, malicious prosecution, seduction enticing away of servants, and 
conspiracy.93  He then placed trespass to land and goods, conversion, and 
invasions of patents and copyrights in a category of “Wrongs to Property.”94  
His third category, which he called “Wrongs to Person, Estate, and Property 
generally,” consisted of nuisance, negligence, and “[b]reach of absolute 
duties . . . attached to the occupation of fixed property,” the “ownership and 
custody of dangerous things,” and “the exercise of certain public 
callings.”95 
Those categories were not crisply formulated.  But Pollock next 
associated each of the categories with “distinctive characters with reference 
to the nature of the act or omission itself.”96  In the “personal wrongs” 
category “the wrong is willful or wanton.  Either the act is intended to do 
harm, or . . . done with reckless indifference to what may befall by reason 
of it.”97  In the “wrongs to property” category “the intention . . . is 
not . . . necessary to constitute the wrong of trespass as regards either land 
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or goods,” because “the law expects me at my peril to know what is my 
neighbour’s in every case.”98  And in the third category “the acts or 
omissions complained of . . . are not as a rule willfully or wantonly harmful; 
but neither are they morally indifferent.”99  Liability for such conduct 
stemmed from “some shortcoming in the care and caution to which . . . we 
deem ourselves entitled at the hands of our fellow-men.”100  Pollock had 
organized categories of tort actions around standards of liability: intent, act-
at-peril, and negligence.  Pollock’s organization would end up being 
congenial to other scholars seeking to classify the law of torts in two 
respects.  It emphasized that most of the ancient tort actions, whether 
originally brought in trespass or in case, required some showing of “intent.”  
Because many of those actions were the result of intentional or reckless 
conduct, and the requirements of the forms of action, such as “direct” or 
“indirect” injury, were no longer relevant, placing most of the ancient 
actions in the category of “intentional torts” seemed to make intuitive sense.  
And Pollock’s classification scheme significantly narrowed the category of 
act-at-peril torts, resulting in either intent or “fault” being a prerequisite for 
recovery for most tort actions.  Pollock’s scheme suggested that the most 
relevant feature of tort actions was not the “rights” they invaded or the 
“duties” whose violation they were based on, but the standard of conduct 
with which they were identified.   
The other important scholar to adopt the tripartite conceptualization 
did not do so in a treatise, but he is sufficiently important in his own right to 
warrant mention.  John Henry Wigmore was the foremost evidence scholar 
of his time, but he also was an important torts scholar, who would publish a 
prominent torts casebook as well.101  Wigmore published four articles on 
tort law in the Harvard Law Review in the single year of 1894.102  In one of 
those, commenting on the “general analysis of a Tort,” he noted that tort 
liability may be based on conduct taken “designedly. . . negligently . . . [or] 
at peril” and elaborated on the point.103  In this he obviously was aligning 
himself with Holmes, Bigelow, and Pollock.  Together with those scholars, 
Wigmore helped to establish the organization of tort law based on the 
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tripartite standards of conduct as one of the principal possible bases for 
conceptualizing the field.   
3. The Challenges of Classification: Casebooks 
The legacy of the treatise writers was to make available two distinct 
schemes for classifying tort actions, one emphasizing rights—in what 
respect the plaintiff was adversely affected by particular forms of conduct—
and the other emphasizing the standards of conduct to which tort defendants 
were held.  Taken together, the two schemes revealed that classifications of 
tort actions around the forms of action were no longer necessary.  But a 
difficulty remained for the late nineteenth-century scholars, and their early 
twentieth-century successors, in the production of casebooks on tort law.  
This was the very limited amount of the necessary raw material for a 
casebook in the new era—cases decided after the abolition of the forms of 
action.   
a. The Problem Posed by the Absence of Post-Abolition Case 
Law 
By the last decades of the nineteenth century the forms of action may 
have ceased to be a feature of modern tort actions and may not have been 
perceived as helpful classification devices.  Nonetheless, as a practical 
matter, most collections of tort cases still would have had to include a 
majority of cases employing the forms of action, because little else was 
available.  Suits in tort had for centuries been brought into court under 
trespass and case.  Only in the most recent decades had tort suits not been 
brought in this manner.  There simply had not been enough time yet for 
post-abolition appellate cases addressing the myriad of different issues that 
arise in tort cases to accumulate.  Consequently, in whatever way a 
casebook author might wish to conceptualize the subject of torts—around 
substantive principles, rights, or standards of conduct—most of the cases 
that could be included in the casebook would have been decided in the era 
of the forms of action.  A case would therefore begin with reference to the 
form of action under which it was brought, and might be decided in 
language making reference to issues associated with that form of action.  
The result was that it was more awkward to organize a casebook based on 
rights or standards of conduct than to organize a treatise around the forms 
of action.  Casebook authors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries thus did not emphasize the approaches to organizing tort law that 
were appearing in torts treatises in that time period.   
The first casebook on tort law to be published in the United States was 
James Barr Ames’ A Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts, which 
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appeared in 1874.104  It was closely followed by Bigelow’s casebook the 
next year.105  An additional casebook was published by Francis M. Burdick 
of the Columbia law faculty in 1891,106 and had gone through three editions 
by 1905.  Between 1892 and 1915 nine more casebooks on tort law had 
been published.107   
None of those casebooks organized the presentation of cases around 
invasions of rights or standards of conduct.  Rather, each employed an 
organization that combined classifying tort actions in connection with the 
forms of action and miscellaneous presentation of cases representing 
different torts but decided under the forms of action.  Escaping the 
gravitational pull of the forms of action was obviously more difficult to do 
than might otherwise have been expected.   
We can only wonder how confused late nineteenth-century law 
students must have been in torts courses that used those casebooks.  The 
casebooks were anchored in and at least partly organized by reference to the 
forms of action, which had been abolished decades earlier.  But torts 
treatises, to the extent students consulted them, were organized partly 
thematically, by reference to rights, standards of conduct, or both, along 
with discussions of atomistically-presented miscellaneous torts.  To the law 
student, and subsequently to the lawyer embarking on a career in practice 
between roughly 1870 and the early decades of the twentieth century, all 
this would have given the appearance of enormous conceptual confusion, 
with little means of clarification available.  Law students and lawyers 
would have had no reason to suppose that tort law was anything other than 
a disorganized, fragmented, not-very-coherent field.   
b. Bohlen’s 1915 Casebook 
This situation did not improve as the twentieth century proceeded.  In 
1915, for example, Francis Bohlen published a torts casebook.108  Bohlen’s 
casebook is important for our purposes in two respects.  First, Bohlen was a 
 
 104. JAMES BARR AMES, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1874).  In the 1893 
and 1905 editions of Ames’ casebook Jeremiah Smith was a co-author.  See e.g., JAMES BARR AMES 
& JEREMIAH SMITH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1893).  
 105. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1875). 
 106. FRANCIS M. BURDICK, CASES ON TORTS SELECTED AND ARRANGED FOR THE USE OF LAW 
STUDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH POLLOCK ON TORTS (1891). 
 107. GEORGE CHASE, LEADING CASES UPON THE LAW OF TORTS (1892); JAMES PAIGE, 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN TORTS (1896); FRANK A. ERWIN, CASES ON TORTS (1900); FRANK LESLIE 
SIMPSON, CASES ON TORTS (1908); WM. DRAPER LEWIS & MIRIAM MCCONNELL, EQUITY 
JURISDICTION, TORTS: A COLLECTION OF CASES WITH NOTES (1908); WIGMORE, supra note 101; 
RICHARD D. CURRIER & OSCAR M. BATE, CASES ON TORTS (1914); CHARLES M. HEPBURN, CASES 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1915); CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES ON TORTS (1915).  
 108. FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1915).  
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prominent torts scholar on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, who would eight years later be named by the newly-formed 
American Law Institute as the Reporter for the Restatement of Torts.  In 
that capacity, he would make an attempt to reconceptualize the field.   
Second, Bohlen’s casebook, and the dilemma it reflected, was 
representative of the state of the field at that time.  Bohlen began the 
preface to his casebook by stating that “[t]he preparation of a collection of 
cases on the law of Torts has certain difficulties peculiar to itself” because 
“[i]n perhaps no other important branch of the law is there so little 
agreement as to . . . how [the subject] should be classified and arranged.”109  
Bohlen then introduced his own approach to classification by noting that 
“the method used by the older text writers was to adopt a purely procedural 
classification[,]” emphasizing “the form of action appropriate for the 
redress of particular wrongs.”110  Because that approach treated 
“[p]rinciples[] which determined the liability in a particular form of tort 
action . . . as though distinct from those applicable to any other form of tort 
action,” it made “little or no effort to ascertain the fundamental principles 
underlying the law of Torts as a whole.”111   
Bohlen maintained that “[t]his method, still used by many able text 
writers,” was “entirely opposed to the trend and spirit of the modern study 
of law,” which was concerned with classifying legal subjects around their 
fundamental principles.112  The reader of those passages would have been 
justified in thinking that Bohlen was going to introduce the “fundamental 
principles underlying tort law” and adopt an approach consistent with the 
“trend and spirit of the study of modern law.”  But that is not at all what his 
casebook did.   
Abandoning the old method altogether posed difficulties, Bohlen said.  
One was that “among even modern students of the law of Tort there is little 
or no unanimity as to the proper way of arranging the subject so as to best 
present to the student its underlying principles and philosophy.”113  Each 
writer on tort law needed to “adopt his own arrangement.”114  The other 
difficulty was that “while classification solely in accordance with the forms 
of action is undoubtedly unscientific and unsatisfactory,” it was still 
embedded in “the mind of the legal profession.”115  For this reason, Bohlen 
 
 109. Id. at iii.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at iv.  
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believed, casebook editors had to reckon with the fact that they were 
preparing students for law practice, where they would be encountering 
senior members of the bar and judges in courts, all of whom had been 
taught and continued to understand tort law through an emphasis on the 
forms of action.  Bohlen felt that a “law teacher . . . [who] commits himself 
to teaching the student any revolutionary view of his subject or adopts any 
personal arrangement of it entirely contrary to that adopted by the 
profession . . . must be very sure of his ground.”116  And apparently Bohlen 
was not.   
Consequently, Bohlen explained, he was not planning any 
“revolutionary” or even “novel” framing of the cases he had collected.117  
He retained the “old division into actions . . . whenever helpful to explain 
the historical development of general principles, or whenever the subject 
matter is so distinct” that an emphasis on the forms of action served to 
illuminate controlling doctrines.118  Of the three “Books” into which his 
casebook was divided, Book I was “devoted to a rather elaborate scrutiny of 
the various formed actions of Trespass” and of “the writ of Disseisin 
and . . . the action of Trover, closely akin in scope and content to trespass to 
real and personal property.”119  This “cleared” the “way” for Book II, by far 
the largest in the casebook, in which Bohlen took up negligence cases as 
well as handful of cases “which show a survival of the primitive idea that 
one doing harm must make it good, though free from personal fault,” and “a 
persistence of the equally primitive idea that no actual harm is required if 
the plaintiff’s principal interests are directly and intentionally offended.”120   
Bohlen did observe that “the tolerance of harmful acts because of their 
social convenience” was an emerging “principle,” which he labeled 
“modern.”121  That new rationale for refraining from imposing liability for 
some harmful acts, Bohlen thought, “reflects a change in philosophic 
thought, a revolt from . . . extreme individualism.”122  Indeed, as early as 
1911, Bohlen had employed the term “interest” in discussing whether the 
strict liability principle of Rylands v. Fletcher should be limited in a society 
whose increasingly industrialized and urbanized character had resulted in 
numerous socially useful but dangerous activities being part of the 
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experience of modern Americans.123  By 1915, then, Bohlen seems to have 
been poised to advance a conception of tort law as evolving from a series of 
actions designed to protect individuals from being injured to one 
emphasizing the social “interests” at stake in tort cases, interests that went 
beyond the rights and duties of individuals in an action in tort.   
But Bohlen did not take the next step and adopt that approach in his 
casebook.  Either he felt that his audience was not ready for it, or his 
thinking had not developed to the point at which that approach could be the 
basis for his reorganizing all of tort law.  Instead, Bohlen’s organization 
was nominally based on the forms of action.  But then midway into the 
material even that organization broke down, with separate chapters on 
particular causes of action (such as deceit and defamation),124 particular 
duties (such as those of landowners, manufacturers, and suppliers of 
chattels),125 and particular tort doctrines, such as contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk.126  In many respects Bohlen’s 1915 casebook did 
not look very different from those published by Ames in 1874 and Bigelow 
in 1875.127   
* * * 
The principal impression we derive from our examination of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century treatises and casebooks is of the 
absence of any consensus during this period regarding the proper way to 
think about the law of torts.  There was recognition that the now-abolished 
forms of action were an inappropriate basis for organizing the subject, 
though the fact is that most scholars still could not completely transcend 
them.  There were halting but incomplete and unsuccessful efforts (such as 
Cooley’s) to organize tort law on the basis of rights or interests protected.  
And there were a few prominent figures who had talked about tort law 
differently—in terms of the three standards of conduct.  But neither Holmes 
nor Wigmore had written an entire treatise; Pollock had done so but was 
English; and the tripartite division was not then the dominant framework 
that it would become a half-century later.  Rather, tort law was only partly 
 
 123. Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, in FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN 
THE LAW OF TORTS 366–67 (1926).  In that essay Bohlen maintained that “[t]he most important 
function of modern tort law” was “to apply fundamental and traditional conceptions of justice to the 
solution of new social and economic problems,” in which “the interests of one person or class 
conflict with the interests of another person or class.”  Id. at 367–68.  
 124. BOHLEN, supra note 108, at xii, xiv. 
 125. Id. at xi–xiii. 
 126. Id. at xv. 
 127. A glance at the Table of Contents of AMES, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 104 
and BIGELOW, LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 105, reveal that the organization 
of both of those casebooks were also a combination of writ-based and miscellaneous classifications 
of tort actions.   
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organized, treatises and casebooks employing various combinations of the 
forms of action, rights-based analysis, and division by reference to 
standards of conduct.  And whatever combination was employed, the 
presentation invariably included a miscellany of freestanding torts that 
seemed to have little in common.  The field was conceptually unorganized. 
It would not be surprising, then, that a Restatement of Torts, which 
would begin preparation in 1923, while seeking to surmount the 
organizational difficulties that had challenged torts scholars for the past 
fifty years, would end up reflecting those difficulties.  As the next Part 
shows, try as he might, Reporter Bohlen would find that he could not easily 
escape the gravitational pull of the past.   
II. THE FIRST RESTATEMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
The American Law Institute was founded in 1923, with the aim of 
organizing and improving the law.  The immediate method of doing so was 
to prepare “restatements” of the law, which were to “present an orderly 
statement of the general common law.”128  The need for such an effort was 
recognition of the “increasing volume of . . . decisions . . . and the 
numerous instances in which the decisions are irreconcilable,” which were 
“rapidly increasing the law’s uncertainty and lack of clarity.”129  The first 
Restatements that the ALI undertook were Contracts, Torts, and Conflicts 
of Law.130  There soon followed Agency, Business Associations, Property, 
and Trusts.131   
A. The Awkward Fit of Torts into the Restatement Paradigm 
It is obvious from the ALI’s stated aims that its founders thought that 
these subjects were susceptible to “orderly statement,” and that their 
“uncertainty” and “lack of clarity” could be remedied.132  Whatever was the 
case for the other subjects of the first restatements, torts posed a special 
problem.  As Part I demonstrated, what we now call tort law had until 
recently been a set of largely procedural pigeon-holes embedded in the 
forms of action and the writ system.133  Tort law became a distinct subject 
only in the second half of the nineteenth century, after the forms of action 
 
 128. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS viii (AM. LAW INST. 1934).  See also “The Story of ALI, 
ALI,” https://www.ali.org/about-ali/story-line/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
 129. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ix (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 130. Id. at x.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at viii–ix.  
 133. See supra Part I. 
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were abolished and substance took priority over procedure.  Not only, 
however, was the subject of tort law new.  In addition, and more 
importantly, what made it a distinct subject—aside from the fact that it 
involved civil liability but not for breach of contract—was not immediately 
clear.  It certainly had not thus far been amenable to easy systemization.134   
Yet, as it emerged, the Restatement paradigm involved not only stating 
the law so as to reduce its “uncertainty” and enhance its “clarity.”  To 
present an “orderly statement” also meant organizing, or conceptualizing, 
the field being restated.  In each field there tended to be an overall 
organizing concept—in contracts the concept was promising.  In property 
the concept was the nature of rights to or in a thing—about which there 
were rules to be restated, or around which a conceptual structure could be 
built.  In contracts, for example, this meant setting out the core rules 
governing promising—contract formation, consideration, the rights of third 
parties, assignment, interpretation, breach, and remedies.135  In property, 
this meant dividing up the subject of ownership into the law governing 
freehold estates, future interests, restrictions on the creation of property 
interests, and servitudes.136   
In contrast, there was no analogous organizing concept available in tort 
law; the subject was not coherent in any obvious way.  Notably, as Part I 
showed, after the forms of action were abolished, the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century treatise writers had struggled to find a coherent 
substantive basis or even several bases for organizing the law of torts.137  
Since then, generations of law students have simply learned that a tort is 
“[a] civil wrong not arising out of contract.”138  That may be good enough 
for the first day of law school, but it is not much of a concept, and certainly 
is not a basis for organizing the whole subject.  Making a list of civil 
wrongs not arising out of contract is not the same as organizing or 
conceptualizing the wrongs that are on the list.  The challenge for a torts 
restatement was how to do that.   
It is impossible to review the drafts and final version of the First 
Restatement, and especially the material on intentional torts, without being 
simultaneously impressed and bemused by its effort to meet that challenge.  
The first draft was a heroic effort to organize tort law in a way that 
 
 134. At the time the early Restatements were published, there were a number of other criticisms 
that fall outside of our concerns in this Article, involving (among other things) the deceptive putative 
certainty associated with formulating black-letter rules.  See generally G. Edward White, The 
American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (1997). 
 135. See generally, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 136. See generally, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (AM. LAW INST. 1936). 
 137. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.   
 138. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 1. 
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improved on the efforts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
scholars to get beyond the now-abolished forms of action.  But in 
retrospect, certain features of that first effort seem almost quaint.  And the 
vision of a new structure that was reflected in the first draft quickly faded 
away.  Subsequent material on negligence, other bases of liability, and other 
torts did not reflect this vision, and eventually even the later drafts on the 
intentional torts largely dropped the initial vision, without substituting a 
different, coherent one.   
We previously noted that the Reporter for the Restatement was 
Professor Francis H. Bohlen, who had arranged his 1915 torts casebook by 
reference to the forms of action, noting that there was “no unanimity as to 
the proper way of arranging” the subject of torts, and that each author 
therefore had to “adopt his own arrangement.”139  Bohlen’s thinking had 
evidently evolved during the ensuing ten years, for his initial draft for the 
Restatement departed dramatically from the organization of his casebook.   
B. Tentative Draft No. 1 
Bohlen clearly understood the challenge he faced.  Speaking to the 
ALI’s second Annual Meeting, at which a first draft140—addressing only 
battery, assault, and false imprisonment—was presented to the membership, 
he said that: 
[T]here seemed to be only two possible ways of going about it.  
One was to accept the classification, if it may be so called, that one 
finds in the earlier textbooks, and to deal with the various named 
torts themselves, which is usually nothing more than describing the 
content of some particular form of action . . . . 
 As an alternative we have adopted a novel method of approach.  
First of all, we have dealt with the legal consequences of certain 
conduct.  We have approached it primarily from the standpoint of 
the effect which the defendant’s conduct has had upon the 
 
 139. See BOHLEN, supra note 108, at iv.  
 140. Torts: Restatement No. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1925) [hereinafter “Tentative Draft No. 1”].  The 
early ALI nomenclature was not completely consistent, and it is complicated by the nomenclature 
used by HeinOnline, where the drafts are available.  For the most part, during the years with which 
we are concerned, it appears from their title pages that drafts submitted to the Council—the Board 
of the ALI—tended to be termed “Tentative” drafts, and were sometimes simply identified by the 
abbreviation “T.D.” followed by a number.  Drafts submitted to the membership at the “Annual 
Meeting” tended to be referred to as “Preliminary Draft No. __.”  A statement on the title page of 
Tentative Draft No. 1 indicates that the same draft was submitted first to the Council and then to the 
Annual Meeting.  This draft had neither the Tentative Draft nor Preliminary Draft designation on 
its title page.  It is accessible in the HeinOnline American Law Institute Library directory 
“Restatement and Principles of the Law” > “Torts” > “Restatement of the Law Torts (1923-2020)” 
database as “Tentative Draft No. 1.”  That is how we will cite it.  We will cite other drafts in the 
same manner simply by using the name that renders them accessible in the HeinOnline database.  
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plaintiff. . . . Now, I agree that to the person not used to this method 
of approach there may be some difficulty in understanding exactly 
what we, the Reporter and his Advisers, are attempting to lay 
before you.141 
The approach Bohlen described may have seemed “novel” to the 
lawyers at the ALI Annual Meeting, many of whom would have been 
educated during the first years after the forms of action were abolished.  But 
the approach actually was not completely unprecedented.  “[T]he effect 
which the defendant’s conduct has had upon the plaintiff” to which Bohlen 
referred sounds a lot like what a number of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century treatise writers had flirted with in focusing on the rights 
protected by some of the torts they discussed.142 
The first, partial draft of the Restatement confirmed that this sort of 
rights analysis was precisely what Bohlen had in mind, although we think 
that he was probably thinking of “interests” even when he used the term 
“rights” in Tentative Draft No. 1.143  The opening, general heading was 
“Conduct Violating Rights of Personality.”144  The rights of personality 
were listed as the rights to freedom from “bodily harm,” from “offensive 
bodily touchings,” from “apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily 
touching,” from “confinement,” and from “disagreeable emotions” (though 
it turned out that there was almost no protection of this right).145  Aside 
from this list of rights, however, what the “right of personality” consisted of 
 
 141. PROCEEDINGS AT FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING: APPENDIX VOLUME IV 189–91 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1926) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS AT FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING].  Although Bohlen’s phrase 
“[f]irst of all,” implies that he had a second point to make about his approach, he did not make it. 
 142. Id. at 190.  
 143. Although this first draft used the terms “right” and “rights,” the final version substituted the 
terms “interest” and “interests.”  See infra notes 156–158 and accompanying text.  At least as early 
as the publication of a collection of his previously published articles, BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW 
OF TORTS, supra note 123, Bohlen had said that “[t]erms such as ‘right,’ ‘duty,’ and ‘“wrong’ were, 
at the time these articles were written, regarded as sufficiently accurate.  Today . . . an attempt is 
made to find new and, it is to be hoped, more exact terms.  Thus, what in the earlier articles is termed 
a ‘right,’ is in the latter articles called a ‘legally protected interest.’”  Id. at vi.  Bohlen thought that 
the use of the term “interest” signified “a very distinct alteration in the judicial view as to the 
protection which should be given to various interests by the imposition of liability for acts which 
invaded them.”  Id.  Perhaps the most visible proponent of “interest analysis” of this sort was Roscoe 
Pound, who coined the term “sociological jurisprudence” to emphasize that judicial decisions 
needed to be attentive to “social interests.”  Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923).  Consequently, we think that Bohlen was probably thinking 
of “interests” even when he used the term “rights” in Tentative Draft No. 1, though we cannot 
explain why he did not substitute that term until the draft was revised.  It may be that it took more 
time to persuade his advisors that it made sense to do so. 
 144. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 140, at 5.  This was indicated to be “Part II,” though there 
was no Part I.  That was left open for a list of definitions, which eventually were included in the 
final draft.  See infra note 161. 
 145. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 140, at 5. 
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was not specified.  There was no description or account of what a “right of 
personality” was and it never appeared anywhere else in the first draft.  
Perhaps he intended to elaborate on the meaning of the notion in a later 
draft.  But that never occurred.146  Nor did Bohlen elaborate on what the 
phrase meant when he presented the draft to the Annual Meeting.147   
The first subdivision of the material on rights of personality addressed 
“Conduct Violating the Right to Freedom from Bodily Harm.”148  This 
subdivision began with a Section (the ALI was not yet using the symbol 
“§”) entitled “General Principles,” which listed the bases of liability for 
violating the right to personality by causing bodily harm: acting “with the 
intention of bringing about bodily harm,” acting under circumstances that 
“a reasonable man would recognize as creating” an undue probability of 
harm, acting in “breach of a duty” to protect another from bodily harm, and 
acting under circumstances that are “at the risk” of the actor.149  All this 
material—basically referencing the different standards of conduct that could 
be breached and give rise to liability for bodily harm—preceded reference 
to any particular torts.   
Only then did there follow what amounted to a sub-subdivision, on 
intentional violation of the right to freedom from bodily harm—battery.  
This sub-subdivision contained a number of sections and looked very much 
like the Restatements we recognize today.150  Then, in due course, there 
 
 146. In an earlier document containing no black-letter material, submitted to his Advisors only, 
Bohlen had toyed with including other interests in the “Rights of Personality,” including the “right 
to reputation” and the “right to privacy.”  Restatement T.D. No. 1 at 5 (1923) [accessible in 
HeinOnline as “[Preliminary] Draft 1 (December 23, 1923)” but bearing the initials “T.D.” [Open 
as a pdf to see all the pages].  But there was no discussion of “personality” in this document either, 
and these references had dropped out when Bohlen’s first draft was presented to the Annual 
Meeting.] 
 147. The absence of explanation or elaboration probably foreshadowed the difficulty Bohlen 
later faced in extending interest analysis to the remainder of tort law.  See PROCEEDINGS AT FOURTH 
ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 141, at 192. 
 148. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 140, at 5.  
 149. Id. at 6.  
 150. Id. at 8.  We quote these sections below, so that the reader may appreciate the way in which 
the draft treated battery as a sub-subdivision of the more general right to personality, and of its 
subdivision, the right to freedom from bodily harm: 
Part II. 
CONDUCT VIOLATING RIGHTS OF 
PERSONALITY. 
The rights of personality are: 
1. Right to freedom from bodily harm;  
2. Right to freedom from offensive bodily touchings; 
3. Right to freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily touching; 
4. Right to freedom from confinement; 
5. Right to freedom from disagreeable emotions. 
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were two separate series of sections on “Conduct Violating the Right to 
Freedom from Apprehension of a Harmful or Offensive Bodily Touching 
[Assault]”151 and “Contact Violating the Right to Freedom from 
Confinement [False Imprisonment].”152  There was no equivalent to Section 
1—”General Principles,” setting out the different bases of liability for 
causing bodily harm (intent, negligence, etc.)—at the beginning of the 
material addressing assault and false imprisonment, however, for the 
obvious reason that there was (and is) no liability in negligence, or strict 
liability, for those harms.153   
Clearly, then, Bohlen was presenting the material on the intentional 
torts as part of what would be a larger body of material on the protection of 
the general right of personality and as part of a sub-right of the right of 
personality to freedom from bodily injury, the latter through the imposition 
of liability for intentionally, negligently, or non-negligently causing bodily 
injury.  Battery, assault, and false imprisonment were not presented as 
freestanding torts; they were nested within this structure, first by reference 
to the interest (“right”) they protected, and only then by reference to the 
standard of care that triggered liability under these particular torts—the 
intent to cause harm.   
The logic of this organization—and its only possible purpose, really—
would have been to signal that there were rights other than the right to 
personality that were protected by other torts and bases of liability; that 
when it came to the right of personality, there were other torts and bases of 
liability that protected the right of personality and its sub-right to protection 
against bodily harm; that some of those other torts were actionable without 
 
Chapter I. 
CONDUCT VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM BODILY HARM. 
. . . . 
SUB-CHAPTER I.—GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 Section 1. Causing bodily harm to another, unless privileged, subjects the one causing it 
to a liability to the other, if: 
[Here the four bases of liability are specified: intent, negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of duty.] 
 . . . . 
SUB-CHAPTER II.—THE INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM FROM BODILY HARM. [BATTERY.] 
[Here the elements of battery are stated.] 
Id. at 5–8. 
 151. Id. ch. III, at 30–42. 
 152. Id. ch. IV, at 43–59. 
 153. However, the initial assault and false imprisonment sections did each reference breach of 
duty to protect another from such harm, apart from negligence, as a basis of liability.  See id. at 30; 
id. at 43.  
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intent to cause harm (and indeed without negligence), though battery, 
assault, and false imprisonment were actionable only on proof of intent to 
cause harm; and that the law governing the other forms and other bases of 
liability for violation of the right to personality, and of other rights to be 
specified, was to be addressed within this overall structure in later drafts.  If 
all of this were not the case, then it would have sufficed to present battery, 
assault, and false imprisonment, not as having the particular place within 
this overall structure that they had been given, but simply as three torts that 
had in common the requirement of intent to cause bodily harm or a bodily 
effect—that is, the way those three torts are presented by the current 
Intentional Harms to Persons project.   
Thus, it appears that Bohlen was thinking of organizing the 
Restatement in terms of (1) the nature of each right a tort protected, and 
only then (2) subdividing based on the standard of conduct that applied to 
that tort.  That is why the right to freedom from bodily harm, whether 
caused intentionally, negligently, or without fault, was addressed in a 
framing section (Sub-Chapter I, “General Principles”) before taking up 
battery—intentionally caused bodily injury—in the sub-subdivision that 
followed.  The remainder of the Restatement, if this basis were followed, 
would have been organized through an analogous set of sections next 
addressing negligently-caused interference with the right to freedom from 
bodily harm, and strict liability for it, which would follow down the road.  
Then, having completed the material on the right to freedom from bodily 
harm, there could have been Sections addressing other rights or interests—
first identified, and then subdivided into material addressing intentional, 
negligently-caused, and strict liability causes of action, to the extent that 
they were available.   
Bohlen was off to what must have seemed to be a good start on what 
he had told the Annual Meeting: the Restatement would be organized from 
“the standpoint of the effect which the defendant’s conduct has had upon 
the plaintiff.”154   
C. The Fragmented Structure of Tort Law in Subsequent Drafts 
But it did not turn out that way.  Little of the material that Bohlen 
subsequently prepared followed the rights-based approach that seemed to 
dominate the first draft.  An entire volume’s worth of material on 
negligence that came next completely ignored rights-based analysis.  And 
when the first draft’s material on the intentional torts was eventually 
revised, “rights” were called “interests,” and interests-based analysis now 
 
 154. PROCEEDINGS AT FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 141, at 190. 
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took a distinctly back seat even in that material.  Finally, a whole series of 
other torts were treated as freestanding causes of action that were not linked 
to any other torts protecting the same interest, and in most instances there 
was no reference at all to the interest they each protected individually.  The 
apparently unified vision of tort law foreshadowed by the first draft had 
given way to fragmentation.   
1. The First Material on Negligence 
After completing drafts on the intentional torts, Bohlen turned to 
negligence.  Like the material on bodily harm in Tentative Draft No. 1, his 
earliest draft on negligence also began with a heading labelled “General 
Principles.”155  But in contrast to what Tentative Draft No. 1 had done for 
battery and presaged for negligently-caused bodily injury, the negligence 
material made no reference, in the General Principles or in any subsequent 
Section, to the right of personality, to the right to freedom from bodily 
injury, or to the interest or interests protected by liability for negligence.156   
The initial material in the draft was about the nature of negligence, not 
the rights that liability for negligence protects.  Nor did anything in the final 
version of the negligence material, which occupied the entirety of Volume 
II, make reference to any interest protected, until the eighteenth of nineteen 
chapters, on “Negligent Invasions of Interests in the Physical Condition of 
Land and Chattels.”157  Even here the reference appears to be to the notion 
of ownership “interests,” such as fee simples and easements, rather than to 
substantive interests such as an interest in enjoyment or use of property.  
The entire structure that the first draft adopted had disappeared, as if it had 
never existed.   
2. The Revised Material on the Intentional Torts 
Not only did the entire volume on negligence ignore rights analysis, 
the next time the material on battery, assault, and false imprisonment was 
presented, the rights analysis it previously contained had been sharply 
reduced.  This was when the material came before the 1934 Annual 
Meeting for final approval in revised form.  In the revision there was still 
brief reference to the protection of interests—in fact, for the terms “right” 
and “rights” that had been used in Tentative Draft No. 1, “interest” and 
“interests” had been expressly substituted.158   
 
 155. Preliminary Draft No. 20 at 7 (AM. LAW. INST. May 18, 1928). 
 156. Id. at 7–51. 
 157. 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 18, at 1287 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934).  
 158. For discussion of this change in terminology, see supra note 143. 
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But the interest analysis that remained was a pale shadow of the 
interest-based organization that had dominated Tentative Draft No. 1.  No 
longer was there an opening umbrella heading referencing the general right 
to protection against conduct violating rights or interests of personality.  No 
longer was there a separate framing section (what had been “General 
Principles”) referencing the three standards of conduct as the possible bases 
for protecting the right of or interest in freedom from bodily harm.  Rather, 
there was merely a brief mention in an “Introductory Note” that the interest 
in freedom from bodily harm was also sometimes protected against 
negligent invasion and against invasions caused without negligence.159  
There followed a heading entitled “Intentional Invasions of Legally 
Protected Interests in Personality and Property.”160  The material 
straightforwardly addressed the three intentional torts, as well as trespass to 
land and chattels, indicating which interest each protected.   
In presenting this material to the 1934 Annual Meeting, Bohlen said 
that 
Chapter 2 of this division [Chapter 1 now contained 
definitions], . . . which deals with intentional invasions of interests 
of personality and includes actions of trespass for assault, battery, 
and false imprisonment, is really a condensation of Tentative Draft 
No. I [1925]. . . . Here again there is so far as the first Restatement 
goes substantially no material change.161 
Bohlen’s statement was literally true.  There had been “substantially 
no material change” in the material that expressly addressed battery, assault, 
and false imprisonment.  There had, however, been a substantial, though 
subtle, change in the framing and apparent conceptualization of that 
material.  The intentional torts were no longer part of a larger heading under 
which all invasions of the interest in personality, or in which all freedom 
from bodily harm or effect, were or would be addressed.  The intentional 
torts now simply stood on their own, rather than being part of any larger 
category.  And there would be nothing in the remainder of the Restatement 
labeled anything like “Nonintentional Invasions of Interests in Personality.”  
In fact, the interest in personality was never again mentioned.   
Whether Bohlen really believed that the change in the headings and 
framing of the intentional torts that he presented in 1934 was not a 
substantial change from his first draft we cannot say.  He had spent the 
 
 159. Id.  That is how the final product read as well.  1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, ch. 2, at 25 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1934). 
 160. Proposed Final Draft No. 1, div. III, pt. II, at 41 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934). 
 161. Francis H. Bohlen, Discussion of the Restatement of Torts, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 11 
A.L.I. PROC. 476, 477 (1934).  
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previous nine years preparing other material that did not follow the initial 
rights-based organization or its framing.  For him that original approach 
may have been something left behind long ago and therefore mainly 
forgotten.  We have found nothing in the ALI archives reflecting his 
thinking about the matter or indicating when his conception had changed.162  
At the very least, we can say that continuation and extension of the rights-
based approach in the material that he went on to draft after 1925 did not 
occur.   
3. The Other Torts 
Nor did the Restatement go on to classify groups of any of the other 
torts based on some distinctive and generalized conception of their effects 
on the plaintiff or the interests they protected, as it had originally attempted 
to do with invasion of the interest in “personality.”  Instead, the 
Restatement would end up being a mixture of the following: unanalyzed 
interest identification organizing the intentional torts and a few others; 
abstract material on negligence making no reference to interests protected; 
and piecemeal treatment of the other torts.  The last treatment gave no 
indication of what those torrs may have had in common, and made little or 
no reference to the interests they protected.   
The Restatement was more orderly than many of the nineteenth-
century treatises we surveyed above; it was not the “grab-bag” that they 
were.  But it was not significantly more organized conceptually, as the first 
draft seemed to promise it would be.163  The first two and a half volumes 
addressed liability for the intentional torts, negligence, and absolute 
liability, with the minimal interest analysis that we have discussed 
associated with the former, and virtually no such analysis applied to this 
 
 162. The University of Pennsylvania Biddle Law Library maintains the ALI archives, and 
contains not only drafts but also some minutes and other less formal material.  For the contents, see  
Jordon Steele, Leslie O’Neill & Emily Johns, First Restatement of the Law Records, 1923-1965, U. 
PA. FINDING AIDS, http://dla.library.upenn.edu/dla/ead/detail.html?id= 
EAD_upenn_biddle_USPULPULALI04001 (last updated July 18, 2014). 
 163. Professor Green, one of the Reporters for the Third Restatement, observes that Bohlen 
provided “structure and organisation to this topic” of torts.  Michael D. Green, Professor Francis 
Hermann Bohlen (1868-1942), in SCHOLARS OF TORT LAW, supra note 69, at 135.  But he then 
observes that the First Restatement “relied predominately on a combination of legally protected 
interests and specific types of wrongful conduct,” which is not the way we have described it.  Id.  
Learned Hand praised Bohlen for “trying to impose some pattern upon the amorphous material” of 
torts.  Learned Hand, Francis Hermann Bohlen, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 386 (1943).  Notably, 
however, Hand did not indicate that Bohlen succeeded in doing so.  Id.  Although Professor Kelley 
does not express an opinion on the issue, he argues that “Bohlen was not a systematic 
thinker . . . . He was a master of ‘microtheory.’”  Patrick J. Kelley, The First Restatement of Torts: 
Reform by Descriptive Theory, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 123–24 (2007). 
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other material.  The second half of Volume III and all of Volume IV took 
the piecemeal approach, separately addressing Deceit, Defamation, 
Disparagement, Unjustifiable Litigation, Interference in Domestic 
Relations, Interference with Business Relations, and Invasions of the 
Interest in Land other than by Trespass.  Except for “Interference with 
Business Relations,” there was no significant classification of any torts in 
combined analytical or interest-based categories, and there was little 
reference to interest protection in the piecemeal discussions of each tort.   
Further, the superficiality of the interest analysis that did appear was 
evident.  For example, final versions of a few chapters referred to an 
“interest” protected—the material on trespass, for example, referred to the 
“interest” in the exclusive possession of land,164 and the material on 
defamation carried the subheading, “Invasions of Interest in 
Reputation”165—but most did not.  And in any event, those references were 
not part of a classification system, but merely synonyms describing the 
freestanding torts of trespass and defamation.   
The result is that when it occurred at all, the Restatement approach of 
classifying based on the effect of the defendant’s conduct on the plaintiff 
was, in effect, merely tautological.  False imprisonment distinctively 
involved unlawful confinement of the plaintiff; defamation distinctively 
involved a communication to a third party that injured the plaintiff’s 
reputation.  Sometimes the classification was even expressly tautological.  
For example, trespass to personal property and conversion were addressed 
under the headings, “The Interest in the Retention of the Possession of 
Chattels” and “The Interest in the Availability of Chattels to Possession.”166  
What defined each tort was what determined its “classification.”  But since 
something different defined each tort, except for the linkage of battery, 
assault, and false imprisonment, there really was no interest-based 
classification at all, but just a list of torts that were not classified, simply 
introduced by reference to the interest each tort protected.   
4. Explaining the Change of Approach 
We will never know exactly what went through Bohlen’s mind as he 
continued to work on the Restatement, unless records of his thinking that 
we doubt exist are discovered.167  But it is worth speculating briefly on his 
 
 164. 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 7, at 357 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 165. 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 24, at 137 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
 166. 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 9, Topic 2, at 565 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); id. Topic 3, at 
572. 
 167. Professor Michael Green made a search for Bohlen’s private papers in various sources but 
was unable to locate any.  See Green, supra note 163, at 133–34. 
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intellectual posture during the critical period between the appearance of 
Tentative Draft No. 1 in April, 1925, and the first draft on negligence, 
Preliminary Draft No. 20, about three years later in May, 1928.  What 
happened to his thinking during those three years?   
One possibility is that Bohlen never had a systematic organization of 
the Restatement in mind.  On that view, his thinking did not change.  
Perhaps, when he told the 1925 Annual Meeting that he had organized his 
first draft based on the effect of the defendant’s conduct on the plaintiff, he 
had only the intentional torts in mind.168  Perhaps he conceived of the 
intentional torts and some other individual torts (fraud and defamation, for 
example) in this way, but did not think that the law of negligence and strict 
liability could conform to that model.  That is, perhaps Bohlen was already 
thinking that the overall structure of tort law was fragmented, and that the 
ultimate organization of the Restatement would reflect that fragmentation.   
The argument for this interpretation is that the second edition of 
Bohlen’s casebook on torts was published in the same year as Tentative 
Draft No. 1,169 and the overall structure and organization of the casebook—
which of course covered all of the subject, not just the intentional torts—
does not reflect a new vision of tort law.  If Bohlen were thinking of a new 
structure for tort law, would his casebook have not already reflected it?  
Maybe not.  Recall that he had stated in the preface to the first edition in 
1915 that, in effect, the market for casebooks discouraged innovation.  The 
structure of the second edition, though altered in significant ways from the 
first edition, also resembled that edition, and the inertia often associated 
with later editions of casebooks may therefore explain some of its mixed 
organization.  It was a striking blend of the various classification schemes 
employed since Cooley,170 including over 700 pages on “The Development 
of Tort Liability by the Action of Trespass on the Case,”171  which looked 
backward, rather than forward to the ultimate organization of the First 
Restatement.   
 
 168. PROCEEDINGS AT FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 141, at 190 (“We have 
approached it primarily from the standpoint of the effect which the defendant’s conduct has had 
upon the plaintiff.”). 
 169. FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed.1925). 
 170. The casebook began with “Direct and Intentional Invasions of Interests of Personality and 
Property.”  Id. at 11.  This of course echoed the seeming vision of Tentative Draft No. 1.  And some 
of the other actions covered, such as interference with contract and economic relations, were 
described in terms of legally protected interests.  Id. at 966, 985.  He also classified some actions in 
terms of the standards of conduct that governed them.  Id. at 158, 168.  But he also described a series 
of actions as having developed from the action of trespass on the case.  Id. at 333–488. 
 171. Id. at 158–890. 
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The other major possibility is that Bohlen was in fact thinking of the 
organization of tort law we have argued was evident in his first draft and 
was the logical extension of what he had already done in that draft.  It is 
possible that he then found, however, after moving beyond the intentional 
torts, that this organization was not feasible.  In light of what he had said 
and done thus far, this seems the more likely possibility.  What may have 
happened, we think, is that the Reporter and his advisors recognized, as the 
project proceeded, that interest analysis was not as promising a method of 
organizing or conceptualizing all of tort law, and particularly of grouping 
torts together, as they had originally hoped, and that subdividing everything 
that involved protection of a particular kind of interest by reference to the 
tripartite standards of conduct would not be sensible either.172  Rather, a 
combination of the tripartite division of tort law based on standards of 
conduct, and the fragmented legacy of the forms of action, took over the 
reorganization of the project—starting first with the intentional torts, then 
negligence, then strict liability, then all the remaining torts.  The titles of the 
four volumes that comprised the final version themselves reflect this 
transformation: Intentional Harms (Volume I); Negligence (Volume II); 
Absolute Liability, Libel, Deceit (Volume III); Miscellaneous Tort 
Defenses, Remedies (Volume IV).   
The challenge of drafting material on negligence—which Bohlen first 
did between 1925 and 1928—could easily have caused such a change of 
approach.  Negligence is both a standard of care and, in connection with 
bodily injury and property damage (and sometimes other forms of loss), a 
cause of action—a separate tort, really.  Framing the material on negligence 
with the notion that the right to personality, and its sub-right to freedom 
 
 172. Nothing in what Bohlen published during the rest of his career, however, suggests that he 
gave up the idea that at least one promising way to think about individual torts was to consider the 
interest of the plaintiff that a tort protected.  We think that he simply found that it was not feasible 
to organize the entire Restatement on this basis.  As we have seen, he had made reference to interests 
protected by tort liability as early 1911.  See Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 
U. PA. L. REV. 298, 317–18 (1911) (“The most important function of modern tort law is, not so 
much to formulate definite legal rules, as to apply fundamental and traditional conceptions of justice 
to the solution of new social and economic problems.  In a hundred different fields of activity, the 
interests of one person or class conflict with the interests of another person or class . . . . The 
solution must depend upon the existing social, political and economic conditions and conceptions 
prevailing at the particular time and in the particular place . . . .”).  As would be expected from the 
recent author of Tentative Draft No. 1, there was also interest analysis employing “personality” 
terminology throughout his 1926 article, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of 
Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1926).  But nothing he subsequently 
wrote, even after discontinuing the effort to organize the Restatement based on interest analysis, 
suggests that he had surrendered the view that tort liability can best be understood as protecting the 
interests of the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 725 (1937) (“The 
primary purpose of the law of Torts is to reach a ‘‘fair’’ adjustment between the conflicting interests 
of the litigating parties.”). 
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from bodily injury, were protected through imposition of liability for 
negligence, would have treated negligently caused bodily injury as a tort, 
and would have carried forward the approach he had taken with battery, 
assault, and false imprisonment.  But it is not at all clear that liability in 
negligence for causing bodily injury would have fit comfortably within the 
notion of protecting the right (or interest) in “personality.”  It might have 
been necessary to identify a different general right (or interest) within 
which to fit this form of protection of the right to freedom from bodily 
injury.  Doing that might have seemed both complicated and potentially 
peculiar.   
In any event, taking that approach would have ignored many aspects of 
negligence as a standard of conduct.  There was a growing body of law 
about negligence as a standard of conduct, wholly apart from the occasions 
when negligently causing bodily injury was or was not actionable.  Most of 
this law did arise in cases involving bodily injury, but it was not limited to 
such cases.  Rather, it explicated aspects of the meaning of negligence 
generally, including in connection with liability for emotional harm, 
defamation, and any number of other causes of action.  This case law 
addressed the objective standard of care, the role played by evidence of 
custom, the significance of statutory violation, and the respective roles of 
judge and jury.  Addressing liability in negligence for bodily injury (and 
property damage) without addressing doctrines that governed negligence 
more generally would have been radically incomplete.  Consequently, the 
material became a hybrid of negligence as a tort and negligence as a 
standard of conduct, and the former was not nested within protection of any 
particular right or interest.   
Since those were the difficulties that Bohlen faced, perhaps he simply 
decided on the approach that required him to forego framing negligence as a 
cause of action that protected the rights to personality and freedom from 
bodily injury, in order to minimize complications and to ensure that the 
concept of negligence as a standard of care received proper explication.  
Then, when he went to draft the material on the remaining torts, he may 
have found that those torts were not amenable to any sort of classification 
that treated some of them together, and that interest analysis applied to them 
individually was mainly tautological.  This is why he would have de-
emphasized his original vision in his presentation of the intentional tort 
material—in order to avoid its contrasting so starkly with an overall product 
that now contained little interest analysis and nothing about the right to 
personality.  What had started out as a new conceptual scheme ended up as 
an organization which was more modern than that developed by previous 
scholars, but not much more coherent or cohesive.   
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III.  REPLICATION OF THE FIRST RESTATEMENT’S ORGANIZATION IN 
MODERN TORT LAW 
Once the First Restatement was completed,173 it might have appeared 
to be a transitional document, using a modest amount of interest analysis, 
and partial classification based on the tripartite division, as a bridge 
between the disjointed organizations adopted by the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century scholars, and some form of future conceptualization 
that would be less rooted in the past and more coherent.   
But in the years after the First Restatement appeared in 1934, there 
was no further transition.  The approach taken by the First Restatement is 
essentially the approach that has come down to us today.  The leading 
treatises and casebooks that have subsequently been published have 
replicated the First Restatement’s structure with only the barest discussion 
of their conceptual organization.   
William Prosser’s hornbook on tort law, first published in 1941, is the 
most prominent example.  The first edition of Prosser’s hornbook began 
with chapters on “Intentional Interference with the Person” and “Intentional 
Interference with Property.”174  The former addressed battery, assault, and 
false imprisonment, just as the Restatement had done.175  This was interest 
analysis in precisely the same form that Bohlen had adopted, though with 
no reference to “rights” or “personality.”  Then followed multiple chapters 
on negligence, three on different forms of strict liability, and freestanding 
chapters, providing atomistic treatment of products liability, 
misrepresentation, defamation, and other separate torts.176  Buried in the 
interior of Prosser’s treatise was the statement that “[f]or no other reason 
than that the author finds it most convenient for what he has to say, the 
general plan of this book is the same as that adopted by the Restatement of 
Torts.”177   
Prosser can be said to have moved beyond the First Restatement in 
setting forth more clearly the tripartite division of tort causes of action on 
the basis of standards of conduct, and in adding his famously lively and 
often critical prose to the lean black-letter rules and comments in the 
Restatement.  Beyond those differences, Prosser’s organization replicated 
Bohlen’s.  In addition, Fowler Harper’s far less well-known treatise, which 
actually predated final publication of the Restatement by a year and 
 
 173. Bohlen became ill toward the end of the process, and others finished up the last of the 
project.  See Green, supra note 163, at 138. 
 174. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 36, 76 (1941). 
 175. Id. at 36. 
 176. Id. at ix.  
 177. Id. at 35. 
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publication of Prosser’s hornbook by eight years, contained the same 
organization and sequence.178  Prosser’s subsequent editions of the 
hornbook,179 and of a casebook,180 never departed from this structure.181   
Other major casebooks and treatises did the same.  Gregory and 
Kalven’s casebook, first published in 1959, divided the subject of torts into 
three parts, addressing physical harms, harm from insult, indignity, and 
shock, and tort law in the marketplace, but otherwise duplicated the First 
Restatement’s approach.182  Nor have there been major changes in the 
organization of torts treatises.  The present-day hornbook by Dobbs, 
effectively the successor to Prosser, contains a slight modification, dividing 
itself into two major parts based on interests protected, physical interference 
with person and property, and economic and dignitary injury.  Within the 
first part, Dobbs employs the tripartite division as the basis of organization.  
But not within the second part: the treatment there is an atomistic approach 
to separate torts.183   
Moreover, the Second184 and Third185 Restatements have largely 
employed the First Restatement’s conceptual organization.  The Second 
Restatement continued to address the intentional torts under the heading 
“invasion of interests in personality,” but then addressed negligence, strict 
liability, and the other torts, without reference to interest analysis.  And the 
Third Restatement’s “Intentional Torts to Persons” project seems not to 
have been concerned with classification, simply launching into material 
addressing those torts without the heading “invasion of interests in 
personality” employed by the first two Restatements.186   
 
 178. See FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933). 
 179. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 
1984). 
 180. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (1951).  The 
most recent edition of that casebook is PROSSER, WADE, & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS (Victor Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, and David F. Partlett eds., 2015). 
 181. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS (13th ed. 2015). 
 182. See CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
(1959). Only the casebook produced by Shulman & James, which deliberately set out to call 
negligence liability into question, followed a different sequence.  It began with strict liability, then 
moved to negligence, then to freestanding torts, and concluded with a chapter reflecting interest 
analysis and addressing assault, battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, without 
employing any generalizing title for that chapter.  HARRY SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1942). 
 183. Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Burbick, THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 2011). 
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1965–1979).  
 185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1998–2020).  
 186. The project indicated only in a “Scope Note” in its first draft that the intentional torts 
“protect fundamental rights of autonomy, dignity, and security.”  Restatement of Torts (Third): 
Intentional Torts to Persons 1, Council Draft No. 1 (AM. LAW INST. October 4, 2013). 
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Even when any of this modern work employs the simple interest-based 
classifications to which tort liability is susceptible—such as Dobbs’ 
breakdown into physical, economic, and emotional interests—they do not 
reveal very much.  Similarly, classification based on standards of conduct—
using the tripartite division—tell us only one of the things that is relevant to 
analysis of the differences and similarities among the various torts.  In 
effect, neither interest analysis nor the tripartite division do very much 
beyond providing a seemingly logical basis for organizing a table of 
contents for a Restatement, treatise, or casebook.  But in fact, the only way 
to grasp tort law “as a whole” at any level of detail is to study the different 
torts individually.  A classification scheme does not do that.   
From the time of the First Restatement through at least the 1950s, the 
focus of most tort scholars was on individual torts or doctrines, although 
there was a growing concern, beginning in the 1940s, with the question of 
whether liability for accidental bodily injury should be based on negligence 
or be “strict.”187  A considerable amount of tort scholarship addressed this 
question, as the issue arose in products liability,188 in auto liability,189 and 
for some scholars, across the board.190  Debates about negligence versus 
strict liability tended to have little to say about intentional torts, because 
those torts did not involve accidental bodily injury.   
It is no surprise, therefore, that beginning in the 1960s the concerns of 
torts scholars began to move beyond what was reflected in the structure of 
the Restatements, treatises, and casebooks.  But new theoretical approaches 
to tort law did not usher in a new conceptual organization of the subject.  
The work of Calabresi191 and Coase192 introduced economic analysis of tort 
law, and within a decade, others—Posner193 and Shavell,194 for example—
were engaged in this form of analysis.  Most of the work of scholars 
informed by economic theory centered on accidental injury, although 
 
 187. For an account of the positions of the major figures, see George L. Priest, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 461, 482 (1985). 
 188. See, e.g., Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects 
in Products – An Opposing View, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938, 938 (1957); William L. Prosser, The Assault 
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120–21 (1960). 
 189. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE 
TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965). 
 190. See generally Priest, supra note 187. 
 191. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 
499, 517–18 (1961). 
 192. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 38 (1960). 
 193. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1. J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972). 
 194. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–10 
(1980). 
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Posner had something to say about intentional torts as well,195 so initially 
new theoretical literature on tort law was directed at only a portion of the 
field.  But when, partly in reaction to economic analysis, philosophically 
oriented scholars such as Ernest Weinrib196 and Jules Coleman197 developed 
a conception of tort liability as corrective justice, and John Goldberg and 
Benjamin Zipursky198 offered a contrasting but also deontological 
conception, civil recourse, the intentional torts fit comfortably within those 
approaches.   
For our purposes, however, the common feature of the theoretical 
contributions to modern tort law is that they involve conceptualization 
without classification.  They make no effort to locate all the different torts 
within a detailed conceptual scheme, or to subdivide them into categories.  
They implicitly accept the proposition that tort law appears to be a disparate 
array of causes of action, linked only by the classic definition of tort law—a 
set of civil wrongs not arising out of contract.  They then seek instead to 
make sense of all, or major portions of, tort law, from a different 
perspective entirely, fitting it into a single descriptive or normative 
conception—welfare maximization, corrective justice, or civil recourse.  
Such conceptions float above the messy details of the different torts that 
Restatements address and that we have been discussing.  The post-1950s 
theoretical literature therefore stands to one side of the central concerns of 
this Article.   
IV. THE CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM IN TORT LAW 
All this brings us to the present.  The century-and-a-half of struggle 
that we recounted above has not yielded anything like a coherent 
conception of tort law.  On the contrary, tort law is about as fragmented 
today as it was 100 years ago.  The odyssey of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts recapitulates the condition of its subject.  Preparation of this 
Restatement has occurred in a series of separate projects, both because no 
single reporter or small group of reporters would dedicate themselves to 
preparation of the entire Restatement for as long as that would take, and 
because it simply was not necessary for Reporters to have a view of the 
entire subject while restating its parts.  Why else would it be feasible first to 
restate the law governing apportionment (essentially contributory 
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negligence, assumption of risk, and problems of multiple causation),199 then 
turn to the law of products liability, and then turn elsewhere?   
The ALI next took up the core of tort law, liability in negligence for 
causing bodily injury or property damage, but termed the project liability 
for “physical and emotional harm,”200 despite the fact that it omitted battery, 
a major form of liability for physical harm, and invasion of privacy, a major 
form of liability for emotional harm.  Battery, as we have seen, is included 
in the intentional torts to persons project,201 though that project does not 
cover all intentional torts to persons.  And invasion of privacy will be 
included in the “Defamation and Invasion of Privacy” project.  There is also 
an entire, completed project on economic loss, that covers liability for 
much, but not all, economic loss.202  The Restatement is effectively a 
collection of independent modules.   
That there is nothing objectionable about this division of labor and 
subject matter, just the risk of project names that are overinclusive or 
underinclusive, is part of our point.  Even the last project in the series, 
“Concluding Provisions,”203 which will include medical malpractice—
certainly a form of liability for physical harm that would have fit 
comfortably in the “physical and emotional harm” category—reflects the 
difficulty of classification and the legacy of the category of miscellaneous 
torts that has been with us since the treatises of the late nineteenth century.  
In short, there is nothing obviously wrong with the organization of the 
Third Restatement, because there is no obviously right alternative 
organization.   
With a full picture of this fragmentation in view, it is time to ask why 
that is the state of contemporary tort law.  In our view there are three main 
reasons, the same reasons that have accounted for this fragmentation for the 
century-and-a-half that we have been discussing.   
A. The Absence of a Substantive Theory of Liability 
We showed in Part I that the torts scholars of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century felt an understandable impetus to classify tort law.  
One of the reasons for this impetus is that, with the abolition of the forms of 
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action, the dominance of procedure in tort law waned, and substance came 
to the forefront.  But what substance?  Those scholars wanted to understand 
the basis or bases for the imposition of liability.   
Much of their organization of tort law reflected their effort to find the 
themes that were common to the different forms of liability.  But their 
efforts always had a “connect-the-dots” quality: the scholars tried to find 
what linked together different causes of action.  One of the reasons we have 
identified for their lack of success was that the different torts had less in 
common than the scholars supposed might be the case.  There was another 
reason for their lack of success, however, that was in a sense even more 
fundamental.   
Those scholars, and their successors to this day, never developed a 
theory that explained why there was no tort liability when there was not.  
Why did some conduct intended to cause harm—some negligent conduct, 
and some non-negligent conduct—not result in liability?  Without a theory 
explaining those distinctions, whether the characteristics that certain torts 
seemed to have in common were actually their operative characteristics 
could not be determined for certain.  Why, for example, was intent to cause 
bodily injury actionable, but intent to cause emotional harm not actionable?  
Whatever factor or factors distinguished those situations would be one of 
the bases for organization.  Without these factors, there would be only 
formal categories, not substantive ones.   
There have been some attempts to develop general theories of tort 
liability in the years since the first treatise writers addressed this problem, 
but those efforts have not provided a detailed enough basis for the 
organization of all of tort liability.  The claims that tort law is principally 
concerned with corrective justice, civil recourse, protection of individual 
liberty, or optimizing welfare, whatever their accuracy, do not come down 
close enough to the ground to explain why there is and is not liability in 
different, related situations.  Those claims therefore cannot be a basis for 
organizing the various forms of liability.  Indeed, they place all of tort law 
under a single heading, without providing any sub-headings or any way of 
developing them.  The very idea of a unitary tort law is inconsistent with 
tort law as we know it.   
Thus, a first reason for the fragmentation of tort law has been the 
absence of a comprehensive substantive theory that explains why some 
activities producing physical, emotional, or economic injury are actionable 
and others not.  Late nineteenth-century scholars sought to address that 
issue by labeling some injuries resulting from seemingly wrongful conduct 
“damnum absque injuria,” but that designation was employed in a circular 
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fashion, and the issue persists.204  Although some modern torts scholars 
have advanced normative reasons for why some injuries should give rise to 
tort liability205 and others have not, in the main scholars refer to specific 
doctrinal rules accompanying individual torts that serve to preclude liability 
for certain kinds of injuries, such as the rule that a conditional threat, one to 
take place in the future, is not an assault.  Since that approach emphasizes 
particularistic rules associated with individual torts, it actually contributes 
to the fragmentation of tort law as a subject.   
B. The Limited Usefulness of Coherent Organization 
The conceptual organization of tort law can have a number of uses.  It 
guides scholars; it enables students to place what they are studying in 
perspective; and it can give practicing lawyers a sense of the relationship 
among different causes of action.  But conceptual organization of tort law is 
the least useful for the practicing bar.  The reason is that, beyond providing 
practicing lawyers a table of contents, the organization of tort law simply 
does not matter much to the practicing lawyer.   
Most potential tort actions fall squarely (if at all) within the confines of 
a particular tort, and only that tort.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers know which tort that 
is.  Their first concern is whether the elements of that particular tort are 
satisfied.  Defendants’ lawyers have the same concern, though they hope for 
a different answer.  It makes little difference to either plaintiffs’ or defense 
lawyers whether the tort alleged in a suit bears a family relationship to 
another tort, or protects a similar interest.  Only in the occasional appeal 
posing a cutting-edge issue or involving a set of facts right on the border 
between two different torts does conceptual organization come into play.   
The result is that there has never been any pressure from the practicing 
bar for torts scholars to develop a better or more insightful conceptual 
organization of tort law.  Treatises are highly useful because they provided 
a source for black-letter rules, and a soundbite’s worth of analysis.  But as 
long as the subject a lawyer wants to find in a treatise is readily findable, 
that is all the practicing bar needs.   
A case in point is Prosser’s “handbook,” probably the most successful 
torts treatise of all time, published in multiple editions between 1941 and 
1984.  This work adopts just about the most atomistic organization possible.  
The book contains only two chapters discussing more than one tort.206  
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Every other cause of action is addressed in a separate chapter, with no 
umbrella or organizing headings other than the names of the causes of 
action themselves.207  Practicing lawyers obviously had little difficulty 
finding what they needed to find in Prosser’s treatise, despite absence of 
conceptualization, or it would not have been as successful as it was for 
many decades.  The table of contents is essentially a list of all the torts.   
If Prosser’s atomistic organization of tort law had served to prevent 
effective litigation of torts cases, there would undoubtedly have been 
demands from the practicing bar for treatises whose organization was more 
helpful.  But in fact, atomistic organization captures the essence of tort law.  
Some clusters of individual tort causes of action may have common 
features.  That was undoubtedly why late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century scholars experimented with classifying intentional torts with respect 
to the common interests they protected or the standard of liability they 
seemed to require.  But we have shown in this Article that torts scholars, in 
seeking to establish some conceptual organization of the field, have 
repeatedly run up against the disparate character of tort causes of action, 
each with their own doctrinal requirements that appear to have little in 
common with other torts.  Given this feature of tort causes of action, 
arguably the most important dimension of them for practicing lawyers, and 
the most accurate description of them for scholars, is their doctrinal 
elements.  And since those elements differ radically from tort to tort, 
perhaps the most coherent organization of tort law is an atomistic one.  
Such an organization, of course, serves to reinforce the fragmented 
character of the subject.   
C. The Inevitable Character of Tort Law 
This Article has sought to show, in fact, that whatever its flaws, no 
superior alternative to the fragmented organization of tort law that has come 
down to us has ever been developed.  And the final reason why no superior 
alternative has ever been developed is that fidelity to the actual nature of 
tort law precludes it.  The great historian of the common law, Frederick 
William Maitland, said that we may have buried the medieval forms of 
action—the procedural writs under which suits at common law had to be 
brought—but that “they still rule us from our graves.”208  We think that, 
although this is no longer true, some of the same imperatives that gave rise 
to the forms of action still operate, and influence the conceptual 
organization, and fragmentation, of tort law.   
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This is because the exigencies that gave rise to the forms of action 
have not disappeared.  Like our forebears hundreds of years ago, we still 
think that some kinds of harms should be actionable and that some should 
not be, and that the degree of blame attributable to the party causing the 
harm may be relevant, but that this relevance may vary, depending on the 
kind of harm or other circumstances in question.  As long as these things 
are true, then something like the forms of action—separate causes of action 
with distinctive, mandatory elements—is inevitable, because some 
circumstances will qualify for tort liability and others will not.   
Although separate causes of action with distinctive elements are 
inevitable, in principle it would be possible to show that many separate 
causes of action nonetheless have common characteristics.  As we indicated 
in Part II, Bohlen appears to have thought at the outset of his work on the 
First Restatement that all the torts would fall into groups based on the 
interests they protected, though the only general interest he identified before 
changing his mind was the right of personality.209  We recently suggested in 
this vein that a number of torts could be understood to protect dignitary 
interests, although the burden of our argument was that dignity is so general 
a concept that it could not do much work beyond providing a label for 
several distantly-related causes of action.210   
Beyond such categories as the general interests in physical, emotional, 
dignitary, and economic well-being, however, the different torts do not 
hang together very much.  This is a contingent fact, not a necessary one, but 
it has turned out that the kinds of wrongs that have been deemed actionable 
in tort simply do not have much more than this in common.  The intentional 
torts of battery, assault, and false imprisonment turn out to be the exception 
rather than the rule.   
Intentional torts share two characteristics, and it takes both of them to 
enable the torts to be classified together.  First, as the label says, battery, 
assault, and false imprisonment, the “classic” intentional torts most 
commonly grouped together, each require an intent to cause harm.  But as 
noted earlier, there are other torts that require intent as well: fraud, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and 
intrusion on seclusion, just to give some examples.  Intent alone, therefore, 
would not be enough to justify classifying battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment together, while excluding other intentional torts.   
The First Restatement seemed to anticipate addressing this seeming 
contradiction by distinguishing the intentional torts that protected the 
 
 209. See supra Part II.  
 210. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 
104 CORNELL L. REV. 317 (2019). 
  
2021] CONCEPTUALIZING TORT LAW 341 
 
“interest in personality” from all the others, but it never got to the point of 
doing that before it changed direction.211  The Second Restatement followed 
the same nomenclature, treating these three torts as “Intentional Invasions 
of Interests in Personality.”212   
The second and obvious factor that links the “classic” intentional torts 
together, and excludes the others, is that each of the three classic 
“intentional torts” protects the interest in freedom from bodily interference, 
whereas the other intentional torts protect non-bodily interests.  But even if 
this bodily-interference classification holds up intellectually, why is it 
preferable to others that also hold up?  Why not place assault and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) together in a separate 
category, for example, since those torts each mainly protect the interest in 
being free form of mental anguish?  Why is assault classed with battery 
rather than with IIED?  
We acknowledge the possibility that the classification that Bohlen and 
some of the treatise writers before him adopted simply reflects the way that 
most people divide up the world.  Assault may just seem more akin to 
battery than to IIED, without analyzing the issue.  Somehow, hitting 
someone, threatening to hit someone, and locking someone up might seem 
to have more in common than making someone afraid of being hit and 
saying mean things that make someone unhappy or cause that person 
emotional suffering.  But neither grouping seems completely obvious, even 
if the former seems a bit more “natural” than the latter.  Both pose apples-
and-oranges problems.  Perhaps this is not a matter of pure logic, but simply 
an unavoidable fact about cultural perceptions.   
But there is another explanation.  Battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment each were actionable under the writ of trespass vi et armis, 
whereas the other torts that require intent to cause harm were not.  The first 
three involved direct, forcible injury (or bodily interference) that fell within 
the core of this form of action because, originally, they involved breach of 
the King’s peace.213  They were the three torts that Blackstone had 
mentioned in his discussion of trespass vi et armis.214  They were the same 
torts (along with malicious prosecution) that Cooley had classified together 
as involving the protection of “personal security.”215  And they were the 
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first three torts that Ames and Smith had addressed in their casebook.216  So 
it is no surprise that Bohlen would also see the three torts as related.   
But it is ironic, nonetheless.  Bohlen’s effort in the Restatement to 
escape the gravitational pull of the forms of action began by replicating 
important aspects of trespass vi et armis.  This organization not only placed 
the classic intentional torts together and continued to do so until this day.  
In addition, the organization places the torts that require intent to harm but 
that were not actionable in trespass vi et armis elsewhere, and it turns out 
mostly outside of any organization.  Fraud and malicious prosecution, for 
example, just stand on their own in most organizations of tort law, as if they 
were separate forms of action.  At least in part because of the legacy of the 
forms of action, then, the other intentional torts are treated in piecemeal 
fashion.   
The alternative, however, would have been even more as unsatisfying 
and formalistic.  Placing all the intentional torts together would effectively 
have adopted an organization based entirely on the tripartite division of 
standards of conduct.  It would then have been inevitable to place all the 
torts that were actionable on the basis of negligence in a second category, 
and all the torts actionable on a strict liability basis in a third.  This 
classification based on standards of conduct would have been a mere 
taxonomy that revealed nothing about the reasons that the different torts 
were subject to different standards of conduct.   
In short, the more we seek some comprehensive organization of tort 
law, the more we run up against endemic characteristics of the field that 
stand in the way of such organization: the absence of a substantive theory 
which can explain, across a range of diverse tort actions, why some civil 
conduct producing injury generates actions in tort and other conduct does 
not; the limited practical utility to be gained from a stronger organization of 
atomistic torts, even if it could be achieved; and, perhaps most 
fundamentally, the inherently fragmented character of the field itself, 
resulting in the only fully accurate characterization of tort law as consisting 
of (some) civil wrongs not arising out of contract.  Prosser’s typically 
exaggerated cynicism about conceptual order in tort law seems a good place 
for us to end.  “There are many possible approaches to the law of torts, and 
many different arrangements of the material to be considered have been 
attempted,” he said.217  “Other than mere convenience in discussion, there is 
of course no inherent merit in any of them.”218   
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CONCLUSION 
After 150 years of conceptual struggle, the organization and 
classification of tort law, and of the individual causes of action of which it 
is comprised, is only slightly more orderly than it was at the outset.  We 
have tried to show why this is the case.  The late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century scholars sought to transcend the legacy of the forms of 
action, but were only partly successful in doing so.  And the various 
organizations of tort law that they developed in place of the ancient forms 
were disorderly.  Bohlen’s First Restatement was an advance over these 
early efforts, but he abandoned his apparent ambition to provide a 
conceptual reorganization of tort law, falling back on a mix of interest 
analysis, organization based on standards of conduct, and atomistic 
presentation of separate causes of action.  The treatises, casebooks, and 
Restatements that followed have not departed substantially from the 
approach taken by that First Restatement.   
There are a number of reasons, we have argued, why all this has 
occurred.  The absence of an accepted comprehensive theory of the 
purposes underlying tort liability has contributed, as has the lack of a 
practical payoff that could be obtained from a new conceptual organization 
of tort law.  The principal reason, however, is that the subject of tort law is 
not amenable to any such organization.  Although tort law can be ordered in 
a taxonomic sense, at its heart, tort law is a series of causes of action—the 
classic set of fragmented “civil wrongs not arising out of contract” that it 
has always been.  Any effort to make it more than that, except at the most 
general level, is bound to fail. 
